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ABSTRACT
The economic realities of declining defense budgets and a smaller global arms
market have, in recent years, forced governments to look beyond their own national
borders when purchasing new armaments. This new global approach by governments in
both the United States and Western Europe has resulted in an unprecedented
consolidation of defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic. The key to
understanding these events and what the future will hold is found in an examination of
the government-industrial relationship, national corporate governance systems, the
direction of the consolidation process in Western Europe, obstacles to future
consolidation, and the prospects for transatlantic cooperation.
An analysis of corporate profit data from British, French, and German defense
companies was completed to study the effects of government involvement in industry and
ownership concentration. While no direct connection between corporate performance and
these issues is possible, both government involvement and ownership concentration are
shown to play a significant role in determining the national composition of mergers and
investments. Cross-border mergers of defense firms are currently obstructed, however,
by a state focus on employment issues, foreign investment restrictions, industrial security
regulations, and arms export controls. An understanding of these issues and the will to
enact reforms is necessary for the future of transatlantic cooperation.
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Following the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the issue of allied capabilities became a
topic of major concern with respect to combined actions. Lacking night avionics, French
Jaguar attack aircraft were unable to fly at night or in bad weather during Operation
Desert Storm and thus could not operate with U.S. and other European aircraft. In their
book, Mind the Gap, David Gompert, Richard Kugler, and Martin Libicki predicted that
given a wartime scenario similar to that of Desert Storm, "the European allies would be
able to contribute no more and no better forces than they did seven years ago" and that
"U.S. military commanders would sooner marginalize than integrate them, lest they get
under foot."2
With regard to NATO's air operation in spring 1999 over Kosovo, the authors'
view was largely vindicated. American forces utilized innovative weapons that
temporarily knocked out power to much of Yugoslavia, while some European pilots had
to broadcast valuable information openly for lack of advanced encrypted radio
technology that U.S. aircraft use. A European aerospace and military specialist at the
McKinsey management consultancy noted that "the Kosovo conflict was a real wake-up
call because it proved that the fragmentation of the European industry was giving even
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Lessons in Restructuring Defense Industry: The
French Experience—Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-96 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, June 1992), 6.
" David Gompert, Richard Kugler, and Martin Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic
Revolution in Military Affiars (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 5.
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less capability than the spending would suggest." 3 Given such a capability gap between
the United States and its NATO allies and the movement toward European defense
integration, the question of closing the transatlantic gap while encouraging such
integration arises. This thesis will examine the changing relationship between national
governments and defense industries and the implications for U.S.-European cooperation
in arms procurement given the restructuring of the Western European defense industry.
An examination of such a dynamic and broad topic requires the identification of
specific focal points. To gain a perspective on the changing government-industrial
relationship in Western Europe and the prospects for transatlantic cooperation, it is
important to answer a number of significant questions:
(1) How does corporate governance define the government-industrial relationship
and how have differing corporate governance systems affected European arms
industry restructuring efforts?
(2) How is the industrial component of the relationship changing?
(3) Has government properly adapted in light of globalization and industry
restructuring?
(4) What impact will the strengthening of Western European industry have on
transatlantic cooperation?
With such questions in mind, the first step in examining defense industry
restructuring is to study the forces at work in strengthening the Western European
industrial pillar. A significant factor affecting the restructuring process is corporate
J
Alan Cowell, "Rivals' Deal Raises Questions on Fate of British Aerospace," New York Times, 19
October 1999.
governance. Defined as "the issues which arise from the separation of ownership and
control in modern joint stock companies" by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), corporate governance varies from nation to
nation. This variance, even in nations with similar political governance (e.g.,
representative democracy), has made attempts to alter the industry and the government-
industrial relationship more complex. Despite such complexity, the consolidation process
among Western European prime contractors has moved forward.
Faced with the prospect of facing U.S. giants such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin,
and Raytheon, several primes negotiated dramatic equity investments. Analysis of the
Western European arms industry has become particularly interesting following the
announcement of a major cross-border merger between the German firm DaimlerChrysler
Aerospace and the French Aerospatiale Matra on 14 October 1999 with the subsequent
inclusion of the Spanish aerospace company Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA)
on 2 December 1999. The French-German-Spanish deal follows the January 1999
merger in the United Kingdom of British Aerospace and General Electric's Marconi
division that similarly inspired speculation on the future of Western European defense
industry restructuring. With details still being worked out in the most recent merger
agreement, the future of industry restructuring is far from certain.
In the debate that has ensued on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the future of
the Western European defense industrial base, the words "consolidation" and
"restructuring" are often used synonymously. For Western European allies to bridge the
OECD Economic Surveys: United Kingdom 1997-1998, (Pans: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 1998), 128.
"Interoperability Gap" while also strengthening their own capacity to produce
armaments, however, the industry must undergo real restructuring and not merely
consolidation. Many throughout Europe believe that simply building larger
conglomerates that match U.S. primes in scale will lift European companies up to the
level of their American competitors. The preference of pan-European
cooperation/consolidation over transatlantic cooperation, however, "overestimates the
importance of scale and underestimates the value of access to American defense systems
know-how and information technology."5 Western European consolidation efforts have
effectively regionalized the defense industry. Pan-European consolidation, however,
should be merely the prelude to a restructuring process involving greater transatlantic
cooperation. In short, the recent consolidation efforts have prepared Western European
industry for globalization.
Globalization remains a fairly vague and to some, frightening, term. The Defense
Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security defines globalization as "the
integration of the political, economic and cultural activities of geographically and/or
nationally separated peoples."
6 While protesters from all points along the political
spectrum may argue that globalization is a dark force that creates injustice, within the
defense industry, it is generally accepted that corporate integration in the form ofjoint
ventures or mergers will bring access to larger markets—a distinctly positive
development. Globalization of an industry that has for so long been closely guarded by
5
Gompert, et al., 73.
6
United States, Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Globalization and Security, 1999.
national governments, has proven to be a daunting task. The Cold War decades have
revealed a number of intra-European security and economic concerns that have
continued, long after the end of the Cold War, to function as obstacles to industrial
restructuring. In conjunction with corporate governance differences, labor issues in
various nations and a continued attachment to Article 296 of the Treaty ofRome7 by
European Union members have hampered past consolidation attempts and will probably
continue to do so. As European firms have discovered during intra-European deals,
obstacles to transatlantic cooperation exist on both continents. An examination of both
American and European obstacles is necessary to fully comprehend the implications for a
future relationship.
As the futures ofNATO and European integration are debated, the importance of
defense-industrial restructuring in Western Europe and cooperation with the United
States will be revealed. While political decisions that affect the transatlantic security
relationship will be made in Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin, business decisions
that will likewise have security implications are currently being made in Seattle,
Bethesda, Paris, Munich, and Farnborough. Only by examining the complex relationship
of government and the defense industry and how it must change will proper restructuring
result. The timing and content of defense-industrial restructuring in Western Europe
requires a thorough examination because of the implications of this restructuring for the
continuation of a strong U.S.-European relationship.
The Treaties of Rome (1957) are the founding documents for the European Economic Community (EEC)
which has developed into the European Union (EU). Article 296 (formerly 223) allows governments to
utilize protective measures to ensure their national "production of or trade in arms, munitions, and war
B. ADAM SMITH AND THE VISIBLE HAND OF GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION
The year 1 776 proved revolutionary in many respects. As military conflict
erupted in the New World with American colonists rising up against the British Crown,
the Scottish economist, Adam Smith, launched the first major literary salvo against the
economic system that had come to dominate British political and trade policy with its
colonies and rivals. In his groundbreaking work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
ofthe Wealth ofNations, the father of political economics condemned the mercantilist
system that many felt had allowed Britain to surpass its continental rivals. Despite a past
history of supporting free trade, mercantilism with its strong encouragement of exports
and outright discrimination against imports, had led the British into a commercial and
territorial rivalry with other European nations. Believing the balance of trade to be a
zero-sum game, mercantilists of Smith's age concluded that the exchange of precious
metals for foreign goods resulted in a loss of wealth for the nation. Fighting this desire to
accumulate monetary wealth, Smith noted, "it is not for its own sake that men desire
o
money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it."
While Adam Smith disagreed with the mercantilist system's preoccupation with
money, he found greater fault with the result of that preoccupation—domestic
monopolies. With the exception of raw materials from British colonies, British
merchants sought to restrict foreign imports and rely upon domestic production. The
natural extension of such domestic reliance is the establishment of monopolies. Smith
material." James B. Steinberg, The Transformation ofthe European Defense Industry, (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 1992), 54.
found fault with the promotion of domestic monopolies on both the micro and macro
levels. In Book Four of The Wealth ofNations, ("Of Systems of Political Economy")
Smith declared,
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production;
and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only
so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the
consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it
would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the
mercantile system the interest of the consumer is almost
constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to
consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate
end and object of all industry and commerce.
In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign
commodities which can come into competition with those
of our own growth or manufacture, the interest of the home
consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of the producer. It
is altogether for the benefit of the latter that the former is
obliged to pay that enhancement of price which this
monopoly almost always occasions.
Sir Alexander Cairncross, Chancellor of the University of Glasgow and Master of St.
Peter's College at Oxford, noted that Adam Smith "developed the argument . . . that free
access to the international market, whether as exporter or importer, was calculated to
improve the efficiency of an economy and encourage its growth." 10




Smith's belief in the balance of the consumption/production
relationship was predicated on the absence of a regulatory authority that caused
disruption. The mercantilist systems of Britain and other nations were supported by
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations, ed. Mortimer J. Adler




Alexander Cairncross, "The Market and the State," in The Market and the State: Essays in Honour of
Adam Smith, eds. Thomas Wilson and Andrew S. Skinner (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976), 127.
regulations proposed and enforced by the state. The proper balance of state intervention
in the national economy has been a topic of great discussion ever since, with the
command economy and laissez-faire liberalism acting as end supports of a governance
spectrum. While not a blind advocate of laissez-faire policies, Smith recognized that it
was executive and legislative acts such as the Corn Laws 12 that had established the
system of domestic monopolies and thus state power over the economy. Indeed, Smith
inferred that mercantilist policies were designed "to not increase the power of the nation
but the power of government." 13 With such strident opinions on both sides of the
government-industrial relationship, Sir Alexander correctly surmised that the one true
question that arises is "the division of labour between the state and the market. For what
purposes should market forces be allowed free rein and for what purposes should the state
try to regulate or short-circuit them?" 14
This fundamental question of government control and influence versus that of the
marketplace is reflected in the current government-industrial relationship. Today,
national governments in Western Europe and the United States generally believe that the
"invisible hand" will lead the selfish decisions of their modern industries to also promote
the common good of society. Unlike other industrial concerns, however, the arms
industry in both the United States and Western Europe has instead been driven in a much
more direct fashion by the visible hand of government. In nearly all nations, this direct
" Caimcross, 113.
" The Com Laws were a series of laws dating back to the 15 th century that restricted the importing of wheat
and other grain (collectively called "com''').
lj
S. Herbert Frankel, Adam Smith 's "Invisible Hand" in a Velvet Glove, The G. Warren Nutter Lectures in
Political Economy, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 8.
14
Cairncross, 115.
action has taken the form of protected markets. In some cases, the outright ownership of
defense manufacturers has ensured the good of society. The end result has been the
establishment of "national champions," or what Smith would call domestic monopolies.
Such national champions represent the fear ofAdam Smith and other free traders that the
aim of mercantilists was and remains to enlarge "the isolating power of the nation-state,
not at promoting the economic freedom of the individual across national boundaries . .
.
The influence of national governments in the defense industry is currently
maintained by exerting control on both sides of the government-industrial relationship
—
demand and supply. Within the confines of a monopsonistic/oligopsonistic market, the
defense industry remains almost entirely dependent upon the procurement policies
(demand) of national governments. On the supply-side, industry remains largely in
control of its own affairs; however, the nature and importance of its production results in
greater government control over the industry. A myriad of regulations govern all aspects
of arms production—from export and industrial security concerns to strict rules
governing mergers and acquisitions. The business atmosphere created by government
within a nation, known as corporate governance, further complicates the supply-side of
the relationship
Though Adam Smith is often held up as the great proponent of free trade, one
must be cautious when using his writings to denigrate strong government control of the
defense trade. In declaring defense "of much more importance than opulence," Smith
made clear his support for the Act of Navigation, a protectionist decree that restricted the
15
Frankel, 9.
shipping of British goods to British ships—effectively creating a domestic shipping
monopoly. After examining this support in its context, however, it can be argued that
Smith would not as wholeheartedly support the current government-industrial
relationship that has produced protected arms markets throughout the world. While
Britain may have no eternal allies and no eternal enemies 17 , as Lord Palmerston was to
declare to the House of Commons in 1848, the relationships in Western Europe and
North America remain close. As Smith noted in his explanation of the Act of Navigation,
at the time of its implementation, Britain viewed Holland with great animosity. During
Smith's lifetime, France was likewise a continual threat to the well being of the nation.
As was demonstrated throughout the Cold War and now in its aftermath, however,
Britain's eternal and perpetual interests are shared by the NATO allies and no direct
threat that warrants protectionist measures currently exists for any of the alliance's
members. Furthermore, it can be argued that through close cooperation with NATO
allies, member states will gain greater military capabilities than by pursuing strictly
national programs.
C. THE END OF DEFENSE MERCANTILISM
While the merits of free trade have largely been accepted in developed nations,
the desire to limit imports and encourage exports remains a powerful force today in even
the most advanced economies. In his article, "The New Mercantilism," RAND




"It is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the
perpetual enemy . . . We have no eternal allies, and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal
and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." Lord Palmerston, 1848.
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themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of
some defunct economist."
18 As Wolf goes on to explain, however, the defunct
mercantilist theories of Jean Baptiste Colbert, Friedrich List, and Alexander Hamilton
have been slightly altered and are now advocated by a new generation of economists in
the United States and other developed nations. Given the title "neo-mercantilism" by its
detractors, the economic system of eighteenth century Europe has been reborn through
proposed trade initiatives such as industrial and strategic trade policies.
Mercantilism was effectively disestablished by the abolition of the British Corn
Laws in May 1846, but it can be argued that it has maintained its sway over defense
industries to the present day. While no longer accumulating vast deposits of gold and
silver, nations continue to invoke the sacred argument of national security in order to
justify protective measures that encourage arms exports while restricting arms imports.
In his 1990 article in the journal International Security, Professor Theodore Moran of
Georgetown University explored the reasoning of states in their opposition to what was
then perceived as a significant national security threat
—
globalization. While
acknowledging the national security implications of foreign defense production,
expressed in the belief that "liberal agnosticism toward the nationality of companies and
18
Charles Wolf, Jr., "The New Mercantilism," The Public Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1994): 96.
19 Wolf defines 'industrial policy" as the development of key industries and technologies, with
international trade playing a secondary role while "strategic trade policy" focuses on international trade by
promoting specific imports and limiting specific imports.
!0
Theodore H. Moran, "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries," International Security 15, no.
1 (Summer 1990): 58.
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the location of crucial research and production activities poses unacceptable risks,"
Professor Moran went on to demonstrate weaknesses in the neo-mercantilist thought.21
The argument that "replacing reliance on foreign companies with reliance on
national companies relieves the threat from globalization," 2 can be countered, as Moran
noted, by the fact that even with its own suppliers, a nation cannot guarantee against
external vulnerabilities (for example, a domestic firm manufacturing high-tech equipment
can be crippled through the use of foreign microchips or other components). 23 Even
wholly or partially state-owned firms are not spared from external supply problems or
influence. During the 1973 OPEC-induced oil shortage, British Petroleum, in which the
British government had a 48 percent stake, refused a governmental request to increase oil
deliveries to Britain. "BP announced that it would place contractual obligations above
instructions from stockholders."24 Admittedly, the monopsonistic/oligopsonistic nature
of the defense industry gives national governments more influence over firms, but the
inherent vulnerabilities in domestic producers remain unless the state engages in
complete defense-industrial autarky.
From a national security standpoint, "autarkic self-reliance in certain key sectors
offers the ultimate protection."
25
Reliance on foreign suppliers and its associated
problems are completely eliminated, but a new set of security compromises present












ensures that advanced technology remains in-country, such a policy also eliminates the
possibility of technology advances through collaboration and a cheaper, more efficient
production process through increased economies of scale and learning. Autarky, on the
other hand, leads to higher costs, fewer units, delayed deployment, and inferior
technological performance. 6 Virtually every major arms-producing nation has
experienced the problems associated with autarky. In a bid to develop domestic military
(with applications to the civilian sector) aircraft production capabilities, the Japanese
government and private firms wasted valuable resources on the FSX fighter project. The
British effort to develop a domestic alternative (Nimrod AEW) to the American AWACS
platform ended in failure with a cost of SI.6 billion and nine years of effort. More
importantly, by pinning their national security aspirations on the Nimrod program and its
long series of delays and cost overruns, the British found themselves "without
sophisticated surveillance or fighter control against Argentine air strikes" during the 1982
Falklands War.
27
To national security policymakers in both Europe and the United States, reliance
on foreign sources for defense articles was an anathema to be avoided even with
efficiency and monetary costs. Economists, however, look to the basic concept of
comparative advantage to justify out-sourcing of certain defense products to foreign
firms and for cooperative efforts on major defense projects. The evolutionary movement






it's the producers of athletic shoes or soft drinks, multinational corporations have long
accepted the concept of globalization within their industries. For arms manufacturers and
their national clients, however, industry-wide globalization has been approached
hesitantly with the still valid concerns about national security. Not wanting to rely on
foreign sources for vital defense equipment, national governments throughout the world
directly supported or encouraged the development of "national champions" in all sectors
of arms manufacturing despite the vulnerabilities previously discussed. Likewise, the
concept of defense autarky drove the defense-industrial policies of nations during the
Cold War though such an actual policy would be impossible and both politically and
economically undesirable.
In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, many of the neo-mercantilist policies,
championed by many national security policymakers and pursued by the United States
and its European allies, have slowly given way to an acceptance of defense industry
globalization. The United States was the first major arms producing nation to recognize
that globalization, with careful management, could lead to great benefits for the industry
and the Department of Defense. Whether through collaboration on projects such as the
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and cooperative endeavors29 like the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) or international mergers such the purchase of the American
8 The theory of comparative advantage states that if one nation that produces many goods can produce a
product more efficiently or cheaper than another similar nation, it is in the less efficient nation's best
interest to import that product.
29 The 1996 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, "Making Transatlantic Defense
Cooperation Work" makes an important distinction between "collaboration" and "cooperation."
Collaboration refers to "joint efforts by U.S. and European governments to evaluate, research, develop, and
produce a defense system based upon a set of common requirements," while cooperation is "the generic
term to cover all other forms of cooperative activities . . ." including defense trade, licensed reproduction,
co-production, and cooperative research and development.
14
defense electronics firm, Tracor, by GEC-Marconi in 1998, globalization will allow
defense firms in both Western Europe and the United States to spread the increasing cost
of research and development and achieve greater economies of scale.
While limited cooperative efforts between American and Western European
defense firms have produced successful systems, globalization could not be foreseen in
an industry that still harbored national champions in nearly all of the armament sectors.
With diminishing defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic, a restructuring of the
industries on both continents that would reduce the number of firms had to occur.
International demand for arms dropped from $1.2 trillion in 1985 to $868 billion in 1993
(1993 prices) and in Europe alone, major weapons procurement fell by 28.5 percent in
real terms from 1985 to 1994. 30 Given such budgetary constraints and a major sales
upturn unlikely in the near future, the issue of consolidation was thrust upon the major
weapons producers in Western Europe and the United States. Restructuring first
occurred in the United States as American defense firms were forced to consolidate in
order to compete for the decreasing number of government contracts. As Under
Secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler noted in remarks to the Aviation Weekly
Aerospace Finance Conference, "dramatic consolidation was the inevitable result of a
dwindling defense procurement budget—which saw a 70 percent decrease following the
end of the Cold War...."31
}0
Katia G. Vlachos, "Safeguarding European Competitiveness: Strategies for the Future European Arms
Production and Procurement," Western European Union Institute Occasional Paper 4, January 1998,
Online, Available HTTP: http://www.weu.int/institute/occasion/4vlachos.htm (23 November 1999).
jl
Jacques S. Gansler, "The Defense Industry Base In The 21 st Century," Aviation Weekly Aerospace
Finance Conference, New York, 14 April 1999, Online, Available HTTP:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ousda/speech/aviationweekly.htm (25 October 1999).
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The budget constraints of the Western European nations likewise acted as the
impetus to consolidation. Economic benefits had soon supplanted many of the defense
industrial base bulwarks built during the Cold War. Western Europe's epiphany came
several years after the same experience in the United States. While this has allowed
Europe's arms manufacturers to learn from the mistakes of their American competitors, it
has also handicapped both industry and government. America's already strong defense
industry was strengthened through consolidation and restructuring efforts and has
established a market share commensurate with its size and power. According to figures
from the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Arms Control, American defense companies
accounted for nearly 40 percent of the world's arms exports in 1990. By 1997, the
percentage had risen to 58 percent. 32 Lockheed Martin's 1997 arms sales of $18.5 billion
alone "exceed[ed] the 1997 national defence budgets of all but ten countries in the
world."3 Western European governments and militaries have also suffered as a result of
their companies' delay. The weak showing by European air forces in the Kosovo
campaign highlighted the growing transatlantic disparity. The pace of change has picked
up decidedly in Europe as British, French, German, Spanish, and Italian companies
embrace consolidation. By taking the next critical step and successfully restructuring
their firms, defense executives and national governments can effectively strengthen the
Western European industrial pillar and compete with the U.S. titans in the global market.
32
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II. STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL BASE
When discussing the structure of the European Union, scholars often mention the
three pillars of the EU: Economic, Security, and Domestic legal policies. Individual
European nations have long established their domestic legal policies and the European
Economic Community (EEC) laid the economic foundations of the modern-day union.
The security pillar, however, has not yet evolved independent of and outside the NATO
coalition to which not all European Union member nations belong. With the slow
formulation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and recent attempts to
define a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the future of an independent
European defense capability has become an item of discussion and contention. A vital
element of any European security structure is a robust defense-industrial base.
Achievement of this goal, however, will require the collaboration of both economic
poles: supply and demand. Those supplying European militaries with modern weapons
systems must work to consolidate, restructure, maximize profit, and cooperate with other
firms. The national governments that demand sophisticated products must privatize state-
owned enterprises, create the necessary corporate environment, and streamline the
weapons procurement process. Only a transformation in the government-industrial
relationship will allow Europe to strengthen its defense industrial base.
The first great step towards the goal of a strengthened European industrial base
began on 6 July 1998. On that date, the heads of state of Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, and Italy signed a Letter of Intent (Lol) that outlined a plan to
restructure Europe's defense-industrial base. With the goal of removing government
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obstacles to the defense trade while still maintaining an active role as regulator and
customer, the Lol nations addressed specific aims and established an agenda for their
adoption. The framework document addressed the issues of:
1. Security of Supply
• Supply management
• Free transfer between the six Lol nations
• To guarantee strategic assets and their distribution
• Monitoring of foreign control
• Reconstitution of key supply facilities
2. Export Procedures
• Administrative simplifications
• Global Project Licences
3. Security of Classified Information
• To insure a high level of protection to classified information in European
Transnational Defense Companies (ETDC)
• Whenever necessary, to harmonize and soften national rules in order to
facilitate the fluidity of information
4. Defense Related Research and Technology
• To avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts through coordination of R&T
programs and funds
5. Treatment of Technical Information
• To harmonize national laws, regulations and procedures for controlling
disclosure and use of technical information in the field of defense
• To facilitate the transfer of any relevant technical information to ETDC
6. Harmonization of Military Requirements
• To define common interest capacities
• To harmonize the military requirements of the armed forces
• To identify projects at early stage for cooperation research, development,
and procurement
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• To harmonize procedures for program procurement
A. WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMS COOPERATION EFFORTS
Since its founding in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has played a
vital role in maintaining the transatlantic relationship on security matters. One important
aspect of any defense system is arms cooperation. The NATO members quickly
recognized that standardization and interoperability were needed if the alliance was to be
effective. While it is private defense companies that actually produce weapons systems,
national governments provide many of the specifications and much of the research and
development funding. Actual procurement of defense goods has likewise been the
purview of government officials. For European nations faced with the daunting task of
funding and purchasing expensive weapons systems, cooperative efforts appear to offer
some respite.
To examine the issue of arms cooperation in Europe, it is first necessary to
understand the types of cooperative agencies that currently operate on the continent.
Three types of agencies have developed in recent years. They include the Research and
Development Agency, the Managing Agency, and the Procurement Agency. Research
and Development agencies such as the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) and NATO's Research and Technology Organisation (RTO) were
established to "systematically explore advanced concepts, identify and validate
technology and provide a forum for users and industry in studies and development
j4
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efforts."" Managing agencies, however, are much more limited in scope. A Managing
Agency such as the Organisation de Cooperation Conjoint en matiere d'Armement
(OCCAR) is tasked with directing the production of a weapons system for several
different nations. In the past, procurement of weapons systems has always been viewed
as a sovereignty issue that fell under the direction of the U.S. Department of Defense or
individual ministries of defense in Europe. Recently, however, the Western European
Union's Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO) and OCCAR have
branched out into this once national domain. By examining the three most important
cooperative agencies, a better understanding of Western Europe's collaborative efforts
and potential will be gained.
1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
In NATO, the vital task of arms cooperation has fallen under the auspices of the
Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). Reporting directly to the North
Atlantic Council (NAC), the CNAD is composed of "senior officials with responsibility
for defence acquisition in member nations, representatives from the Military Committee
and Major NATO Commands . . . ,"36 The CNAD "promotes NATO armaments
cooperation and considers political, economic and technical aspects of the development
and procurement of equipment for NATO forces." The Conference of National
Armaments Directors is composed of several permanent and ad hoc groups. Permanent
^ Marc Rogers, '"Euro DARPA Needed to Bridge Technology Gap," Jane 's Defence Weekly, 3 June 1998,
8, Online, Available HTTP: http://fore.thomson.com/janes/ (1 April 1999).
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groups include the Main Armaments Groups—NATO Naval Armaments Group
(NNAG), NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG), and NATO Army Armaments
Group (NAAG), the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), and the NATO
Conventional Armaments Review Committee (NCARC).
Unlike the Warsaw Treaty Organization, NATO has never been able to dictate
arms cooperation in order to avoid duplication and enforce interoperability. Instead, it
has relied on the CNAD to act as a forum encouraging cooperation for the benefit of the
organization. Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union and inclusion of former
Warsaw Pact adversaries, NATO continues to place an emphasis on arms cooperation. In
1993, the North Atlantic Council approved a number of revised policies and procedures
in ensure continued arms cooperation. The Council stipulated that the CNAD should
concentrate on:
• Harmonisation of military requirements on an Alliance-
wide basis;
• Promotion of essential battlefield interoperability;
• Pursuit of cooperative opportunities identified by the
CNAD and the promotion of improved transatlantic
cooperation;
• The development of critical defence technologies,
including expanded technology sharing.
While the conference dealt with the larger picture of arms cooperation for the
alliance, NATO has also been involved in the missions of research and development. In
1952, NATO founded the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development
"Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)."
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(AGARD) to concentrate research in the growing aerospace field. The broader-based
Defence Research Group (DRG) soon joined AGARD following the 1957 launch of
Sputnik by the Soviet Union.40 In 1996, NATO strengthened its research and
development capabilities by integrating AGARD and the DRG into the Research and
Technology Organisation (RTO) with the stated mission:
To conduct and promote cooperative research and
information exchange, to support the development and
effective use of the national defence research and
technology to meet the military needs of the Alliance, to
maintain a technological lead and to provide advice to
NATO and national decision makers. 41
While NATO remains the primary organization for maintaining the defense of Europe,
European security organizations have also broadened their interests to include arms
cooperation.
2. Western European Union (WEU)
In 1998, Tommy Ivarsson, senior vice president and head of Saab's Corporate
Strategic Planning, noted that Europe "runs national, unco-ordinated technology
programmes and few advanced studies."42 In recent years, however, the Western
European Union has made an attempt to establish organizations to fill the R&D and
procurement roles for Europe—the WEAG and WEAO. The research and development-
oriented Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), traces its roots back to the 1976
attempt by the defense ministers of the European NATO nations to establish the
39
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Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) as a forum for armaments cooperation.
The IEPG's functions were transferred to the newly invigorated WEU in December 1992
and into the newly formed WEAG. 43
The Armaments Group coordinated research and development through three
panels responsible for different stages of a program. The WEAG flow chart below shows
the organization framework and the resultant chain of command (Figure 1).
Figure 1 : WEAG Organization
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Panel I Equipment Programmes: Panel I examines the WEAG nations"
armaments replacement schedules and conducts feasibility studies in order to produce a
plan leading to development and production of arms between collaborating nations.
Panel I also compares results with NATO's CNAD to avoid duplication of cooperative
efforts within NATO and the WEAG.44
Panel II Research and Technology: Panel II operates the European Cooperation
for the Long term in Defence (EUCLID), a government-led R&T program that allows
WEAG members to collaborate in developing technology.45
Panel III Procedures and Economic Matters: Panel III deals with aspects of
common defense economics policy and armaments cooperation such as cross-border
competition and technology transfer. It often uses the juste retour46 mechanism for
determining national levels of participation.47
While research and development remain important stages in arms cooperation,
cooperative efforts in the final step of procurement would provide the greatest economic
43
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benefits. In an effort to bolster the strength of the WEAG and move toward the eventual
goal of a single centralized research and procurement agency known as the European
Armaments Agency (EAA), the WEU established the Western European Armaments
Organization in November 1996 as a legal subsidiary body of the WEU.48 The WEAO
seeks to incorporate the R&D expertise of the WEAG with the ability to place contracts
for weapons systems on behalf of participating nations. The organization was further
bolstered with the inclusion of associate members and observers of the WEU such as
Finland, Austria, and Sweden (a major producer of arms).4
While the WEAG and WEAO seem impressive, they have also been
controversial. Unlike U.S. efforts through programs such as DARPA, the European
defense industry contributes nearly 50 percent of funding for research and development.
Industry officials find this level too high because, "unlike civilian research projects, the
costs are less likely to be recovered on the marketplace."50 The most controversial aspect
of the WEU efforts, however, revolves around the issue of juste retour. With many
smaller arms producing members of the WEAG/WEAO, such as the Netherlands,
Belgium, Greece, and Spain, the demands for a workshare in WEU projects given an
investment remain constant. When combined with a long delay between project
presentations and contract commitments, fewer projects than expected, national funding
difficulties, and an unwillingness to fund and test projects in other nations, the workshare
"Western European Armaments Organisation," Western European Union Website, Online, Available
HTTP: http://www.weu.int/weao/home.htm (27 March 1999).
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issue has prevented the WEAO from moving toward the goal of the EAA and driving out
the four largest arms producing nations. 51
3. Organisation de Cooperation Conjoint en matiere d'Armement
(OCCAR)
Though the WEAO is a subsidiary of a growing Western European Union, many
defense officials have looked upon another arms planning agency, also founded in 1996,
as the predecessor to the European Armaments Agency. The Organisation de
Cooperation Conjoint en matiere d'Armement (OCCAR)52 was established by Europe's
largest arms producing nations—initially France and Germany with the subsequent
inclusion of the United Kingdom and Italy. Frustrated by the delays and bureaucracy
associated with the WEU, the founding nations decided that a separate organization
would have greater success. Unlike the WEAO, the smaller OCCAR does not currently
have aspirations of becoming a European research and development organization. The
mission of OCCAR remains to simply manage collaborative projects such as the Tiger
attack helicopter, Roland surface-to-air missile system, and the HOT and MILAN anti-
tank missiles.
53 The organization was strengthened in September 1998 when the
founding nations began the process of giving OCCAR the legal power to place and
manage contracts through the OCCAR Convention—a power previously held only by the
WEAO. 54 The French National Assembly ratified the convention on 20 January 2000,
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parliament is currently studying the agreement and Britain is expected to ratify the
convention soon.
The Baden-Baden agreement between France and Germany, signed in 1996,
established five principles that have continued to guide OCCAR as it has grown. First of
all, "an optimal cost/benefit ratio must be achieved in the choice of the contractor."
Secondly, partner nations must harmonize both the long-term requirements of users (that
is, their respective militaries) and policies on investment in technology. Thirdly, "the
European industrial base should be strengthened by a substantial increase in
competiveness." The fourth principle waives the juste retour criterion for each project
that normally accompanies joint ventures. The final principle declares that OCCAR is an
open organization that will allow other nations to participate given an acceptance of the
guiding principles and an ability to make a significant contribution to a cooperative
project. 56 Though no additional nations have joined OCCAR since its founding in 1996,
its past record of success, strong support by members' governments, and future legal
status is sure to interest a number of Western European nations.
OCCAR's initial and future success can in large part be traced to its outright
rejection of worksharing on individual projects. In the past, joint procurement agencies
have relied on the application ofjuste retour in determining the share of work given to
each member nation based on that country's purchases. OCCAR has moved away from a
35
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strict interpretation of this principle for specific programs and will instead "allot work
across the spread of programmes it handles, permitting more efficient procurement."57
As a sign of the expected success of the new organizational arrangement, five projects
with British and Italian involvement are to be added to the four existing Franco-German
CO
projects currently managed by OCCAR. Major Patrick Lefort, the Assistant Defense
Cooperation Attache at the French embassy in Washington, D.C.. suggested that the
Meteor air-to-air missile, the newly selected armament for British, French, and German
Eurofighter aircraft, could possibly be managed by OCCAR. The A400M transport
aircraft, Europe's projected strategic airlift platform, could also end up under OCCAR
direction.
5 Such projects would presumably bring in additional nations to the
organization. While such outright rejection ofjuste retour is attractive to nations with
large defense industrial bases, smaller nations who would like to participate in joint
development and production of such weapons systems view worksharing as an important
means of supporting their own national producers.
With dueling organizations both vying to be the foundation of the European
Armaments Agency, the future of arms cooperation remains uncertain. The four largest
arms producing nations have legitimate concerns about the efficiency and cost savings of
cooperation being diluted by juste retour initiatives that satisfy smaller producing
nations. The suspicions of nations such as Greece and Spain, however, currently prevent
57
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OCCAR from becoming the cornerstone. Despite such differences, negotiations will
continue to merge the WEU institutions with OCCAR, for the idea of European arms
cooperation is enshrined in the European Union's 1991 Maastricht Treaty. 60
Furthermore, the benefits of common procurement are widely acknowledged. Efficient
common European defense procurement could result in savings of between 5 to 1 1 billion
Euros ($5.1-11.2 billion) or roughly 7 to 17 percent of total EU procurement
expenditures. 61 For defense firms, a single European procurement agency would
encourage greater economies of scale and cheaper research and development costs. It is
safe to say that arms cooperation will continue in Europe. In government and industrial
circles, a growing consensus that the European procurement agency will take on
OCCAR' s features is growing as the organization is strengthened. In the opinion of Peter
Scaruppe, Counselor for Defense Research and Engineering at the German embassy in
Washington, D.C., it is only a matter of time before other nations (that is, smaller nations)
accept the lack ofjuste retour and join OCCAR. The Netherlands is on the verge of
joining and both Spain and Sweden have expressed interest. The question of how such
an organization would interact with NATO has also not been resolved. Only after
definitive plans have been formulated will nations hand over the sovereign power of
procurement.
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B. GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCE ON THE INDUSTRIAL CLIMATE
At the close of the twentieth century, U.S. defense companies had solidly
established themselves as the leaders of the global defense industry. Whether it was
stealth, precision guidance, or command and control systems, American defense
contractors have and continue to be viewed as the leaders in many technology areas.
Following the 1 993 "Last Supper" given by then Deputy Secretary of Defense William
Perry, the consolidation process in the United States has produced a greatly reduced
defense-industrial base. Despite dramatic decreases in defense budgets following the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States remains the largest single arms
market in world. As a result of such a market and subsequent mergers, American
contractors have accrued many benefits in terms of market share, economies of scale, and
shared resources. Though prime contractors in their own markets and possessing great
technical skills, many Western European firms were often viewed as second tier
manufacturers when compared to American primes. While possessing technical skills
equal to or better than their U.S. competitors in many areas, European companies have
suffered from decreased economies of scale brought about by smaller national markets.
1. Privatization Efforts in the Defense Industry
Since the days of ancient civilizations, private industries have toiled and earned a
profit supplying goods and services to the society. Shortly after the development of the
modern nation-state through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the concept of state-owned
" Peter Scaruppe, Counselor, Defense Research and Engineering (Economics), Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Washington, D.C., Personal Interview, 18 May 2000.
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industries appeared. Jean-Baptiste Colbert was appointed Louis XIV's controller general
of finance in 1665 and quickly instituted a number of mercantilist policies—including
state ownership of certain manufacturing firms. It was not until the twentieth century,
however, that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) achieved prominence as a device for state
control. With their strategic value to the nation, armaments companies were a natural
choice for state ownership. Many Western European governments came to believe that
while Adam Smith's "invisible hand" would guide most industrial owners toward
achieving the societal good, only the state acting as owner, manager, and consumer of the
armaments industry could achieve that positive outcome.
a. Inherent Agency Conflicts in SOEs
While it is often dangerous to speak in generalities, a number of broad
statements can be made about state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In nations throughout the
world, SOEs were established outright or through the nationalization of private sector
companies to meet political goals. In the defense sector, various national security
concerns drove governments to nationalization. A secondary but still important concern
remains the desire to provide stable employment. In stark contrast to the interests of the
state, private sector companies are inherently focused on "the economic objective of
maximizing profits and wealth for shareholders."64 Such lack of emphasis on or
dismissal of profit maximization in favor of political concerns, compounded with the
inability of the state "to motivate the firms in its portfolio to attain competitive standards
in terms of efficiency, productivity, innovation, and orientation towards the consumer,"
64
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have led many to dismiss SOEs as ineffective in a modern market.65 In contrast,
privately held corporations, it is argued, are more flexible and productive with the goal of
expanding profits at the forefront. Though SOEs can be effective under the right
conditions, more-often-than-not, the arguments against them have been proven true.
In the years since Margaret Thatcher denationalized many of Britain's
state-owned enterprises and introduced the term and the large-scale application of
"privatization,"
63
the benefits and detriments of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have
been the focus of intense debate. One undisputed fact that has emerged is that state
ownership places national governments in the difficult position of acting in multiple but
opposing capacities. In the acquisition process of a weapons system, the government
assumes the role of both seller and buyer. While the national military is guaranteed
access to necessary weapons systems through the government ownership of the producer,
the question of whether it is getting the best or most affordable system possible arises. In
addition, the dual nature of SOEs also introduces the first corporate governance conflict.
A corporate governance67 conflict arises when the positions of both manager and owner
are occupied by the national government. While at first glance, it might appear that
government participation on both levels would lead to greater harmony in corporate
interests, such appearances are false. Saul Estrin, in his article "State Ownership,
Corporate Governance and Privatisation," contends that conflicting interests will arise in
any firm where ownership and management is separated, for "the owners bear the
53
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residual risk and receive the residual reward, but it is the managers who control the
decision-making process and therefore make all the decisions which influence those risks
and rewards."6 These differing roles often lead to differing interests, opinions, and
reactions.
While both parties are committed to the success of the firm, the reasons
and effects of that success are embodied in the "agency" model. In this modern corporate
model, "the 'principal'- the owner-seeks an efficient way to ensure that the 'agent'
—
management—acts in the principal's rather than the agent's best interest."69 In the
private sector, a board of directors monitors the managers' activities and performance and
ensures that interests of shareholders are placed ahead of those of the managers—one of
the best monitoring measures being the price of the firm's stock on the market. With a
public sector firm, however, the state, "in the absence of a market for public corporation
stock, does not have the possibility to evaluate performance by following share price
fluctuations.'" Furthermore, with no trading of shares in a market, "sanctions for bad
performance and incentives to managers" are removed. Hence, "[c]ivil servants, who are
not entitled to the gains due to improved efficiency, have no financial incentive to
monitor public firms."71 The end result is an inefficient, poorly monitored firm.
Corporate governance can be described as the rules that seek to square the interests of a corporation's
managers with those of its owners.
Saul Estrin, "State Ownership, Corporate Governance and Privatisation," in Corporate Governance,









With very few exceptions, the United States government has deferred the
operation of manufacturing and service companies to the private sector. Nationalization
remains a foreign concept associated with Third World nations and socialism. Many
nations in Western Europe, however, have never viewed government ownership of
enterprises with the contempt of most Americans. Following World War II, both Britain
and France nationalized a number of manufacturers as socialist governments came to
power. In a stunning victory over Winston Churchill and the Conservative Party,
Clement Richard Atlee and the Labour Party assumed power in 1945. Atlee and Sir
Richard Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade, 1945-47 and Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 1947-50) launched a nationalization campaign that put the iron and steel
industries, railroads, coal mines, and electrical and gas utilities under government control.
Defense companies such as British Aerospace were also nationalized under subsequent
governments.
Perhaps more than any other European nation, France came to champion
the role of the state in industry. Reinforced in this century by the Great Depression, the
belief that government involvement in industry was necessary for its success can be
traced back to the seventeenth century. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV's controller
general of finance advocated state direction of industry and agriculture. It was not until
the twentieth century, however, that the state actually nationalized companies on a large




With historical precedent already supporting government control, the
role of the state was cemented by the French defeat and subsequent German occupation
in 1940. Feelings of betrayal by the elite industrialists, "the need for rapid
reconstruction and the desire for better labor conditions" solidified public support for
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state ownership. Given the titles of Colbertisme and state dirigisme, government
intervention in industry entailed "an under-emphasis on the market and a sheltering of
firms from its effects."75 With the exception of Raymond Barre's tenure as prime
minister (1976-1981) during President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's administration,
dirigiste policies continued unabated until economic conditions forced politicians to
move towards a free-market economy and privatized companies.
c. Move Towards Privatization
While in some cases, government control of a manufacturer or service
provider is in the best interest of society, the state has recently ceded control and
ownership of SOEs to private investors in many nations throughout the world. These
nations have recognized that the market offers superior monitoring and increased
efficiency. In Europe alone, governments have sold more than $200 billion worth of
SOEs since 1 990. While the motive behind such sales was often to bring in needed cash,
privatization has forced many companies to compete for the first time—a decidedly
" J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. and Marina V. Rosser, "Chapter 7: Whither Indicative Planning? The Case of
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positive outcome. Public utilities and railroads have been put on the block throughout
Western Europe, but only Great Britain has withdrawn completely from the armaments
business. Many continental European countries, most notably France and Italy, have
balked at turning over complete control of defense firms to the private sector. In recent
years, however, economic realities have trumped socialist ideology and antiquated
national security concerns, leading to at least partial privatization throughout Western
Europe.
In 1979, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative
Party embraced the arduous process of dismantling the socialist democratic state and
began an international movement toward privatization. Faced with entrenched Labour
foes, Thatcher and the other Tories moved decisively but carefully. As she was to later
explain in her memoirs, Lady Thatcher believed strongly that
The state should not be in business. State ownership
effectively removes—or at least radically reduces—the
threat of bankruptcy which is a discipline on privately
owned firms. Investment in state-owned industries is
regarded as just another call on the Exchequer, competing
for money with schools or roads. As a result, decisions
about investment are made according to criteria quite
different from those which would apply to a business in the
private sector.
77
The first industries to shed the bonds of state ownership were the aerospace and
shipbuilding industries. In 1981, the British government "returned BAe to the private
sector" while retaining a 48.43 percent stake in the company. In May 1985, the Thatcher
government sold its remaining shares and kept only "a special Golden Share to prevent
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BAe's acquisition by non-British owners.'" ' As a private sector firm, British Aerospace
became both a British and European powerhouse in the aerospace industry.
In France, Charles de Gaulle and his conservative successors were driven
by concern for national security and French defense independence to continue the
nationalization of the French defense industry. In contrast, the fundamental party tenet of
public ownership inspired French Socialists to adopt the same nationalization policy.
Neither patriotism nor ideology, however, could fight the realities of economics. A
number of factors combined to force the French government into decreasing state
shareholdings in defense firms. The most significant political factor was the support of
Gaullist politicians for privatization. Preferring market economics to a perceived national
pride in its arms industry, then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and other conservatives
began the process of privatization during the first period of cohabitation with the
Socialists in 1986. Serving as president since 1995 in the second cohabitation
government with Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, Chirac has continued to
privatize SOEs, but he faces cultural and institutional barriers.
In France, the dirigiste system dominated the industrial and financial
sectors until the 1980's. With its strength in the distribution of capital from the financial
concerns to industries, the French state was able to exert great influence through dirigiste
policies. Whereas in the United States and the United Kingdom capital is raised through
capital markets and devices such as the Initial Public Offering (DPO), large French firms
have long relied on capital in the form of long term bank credits from government-run
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 677.
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banking institutions. While French banks such as Banque Nationale de Paris and Credit
Lyonnais provided an ample supply of capital, the system created a dependence on banks
for capital and as a result, a dependence on the state. With finite resources, the reliance
upon the state brought about an end to the great success of French industry during the
early 1970's. "Many of the increasingly evident weaknesses of the French manufacturing
industry became attributed to the highly dominant role of the state. What was once the
success of the state gradually became regarded as its failure."80
The financial problems in the French defense industry resulted not only
from its corporate structure but also from events over which it had little control. While
the United States and other NATO nations significantly decreased their defense budgets
in anticipation of the elusive "peace dividend," France's reaction to the end of the Cold
War was decidedly different. The French government did not make the drastic cuts in
defense spending that its Western European and North American counterparts had made.
The additional years of high procurement following the Soviet disintegration did not
prepare defense firms for the lean years ahead, for such spending could not be maintained
long after the threat of Warsaw Pact invasion had faded. Between 1994 and 1997,
military equipment spending decreased from Ffrl02.5 billion to Ffr86.0 billion. In
1997, the French left-wing government promised to maintain equipment spending levels
at Ffr85.0 billion per year in 1998 francs during the six year defense expenditure plan
78
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(1997-2002). "Taking inflation into account, the figure for 2000 should have been
Ffr86.4 billion." however, the defense ministry announced that the 2000 budget would
earmark Ffr85.0 billion for equipment, a decrease of Ffrl .4 billion. In recent years, the
end result of France's belated defense procurement cuts was evidenced in a weakened
domestic defense industry competing against Western European and American
competitors who had already undergone restructuring.
The needs of France's large defense-industrial base have long exceeded
those of the French military. As a result, France became a major arms exporter and
established a reputation for dealing with customers most Western nations deemed
questionable. Such sales were and continue to be viewed as necessary, for the nation's
industry has become reliant "on export sales to permit the economic procurement of
weapons for France's own use by amortizing research and development (R&D) and
overhead costs over longer production runs." With the French defense procurement
budget cut drastically and an industry still geared toward Cold War production, the
French industry was particularly hard hit when French export sales of arms plummeted
after the events of 1991. Export sales of S5.2 billion in 1990 dropped to a low of $1.6
billion in 1993. Export sales have since recovered with estimated sales of between $5.9
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billion and $7.6 billion in 1997 8\ but a great deal of damage to the unprepared French
industry had already been done. The sales decline had reduced production, undermined
the R&D funding mechanism, and harmed French efforts to remain at the forefront of
defense technology.
With the future of France's sophisticated defense-industrial base
threatened, the French government began looking for a panacea that would not only
preserve capabilities but advance France's position as a major arms producer as well.
Taking a lesson from the United States, many Western European nations came to
recognize that only pan-European consolidation could produce the scale necessary to
compete in the global market. As one of three major Western European arms-producing
nations, France believed that its defense firms should play a crucial role in any
consolidation efforts. The private sector defense firms in Britain and Germany, however,
were not interested in merging with French counterparts that were owned and managed
by the French state. Though it had privatized state-owned enterprises in many industries,
the government sought to maintain control of the public utilities and defense industry for
their respective monopoly and national security reasons. Potential British and German
partners, however, have insisted on privatization. Through privatization initiatives
involving the flagship companies Thomson-CSF and Aerospatiale, the French
government has sought to appease their market-oriented critics.
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government figures, required by the 1998 European Code of Conduct for arms sales, estimate sales of $7.6
billion in 1997 and $7.0 billion in 1998 (George Bloch, "France Discloses Arms Sales," Washington Times,
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In true Gallic fashion, however, the French have devised a method of
privatization that still allows the government to maintain strong influence if not outright
control over former state-owned enterprises. In what the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development has labeled, privatization a la francaise, the French
government has managed "to transfer control from the State to coalitions of investors
willing to keep their shares for a long period and obliged, when selling, to give each other
the first right of purchase to ensure stability." In contrast to the competitive bidding
method of privatization which most nations use to get the top price for valued SOEs, the
French have employed a strategic method of selecting a noyau dur, or "close-knit group
of core shareholders," to "ensure some degree of national control over the capital handed
over to the private sector." With state-owned lending institutions such as Banque
Nationale de Paris and Credit Lyonnais no longer the sole source of capital and civil
servants no longer managing daily affairs, the core group of shareholders lends stability
and maintains state influence.
Recent privatization efforts within the French defense industry have
involved the use of noyaux dur through the practice ofparticipations croisees, or cross-
shareholding, participations d'autocontrole, or self-shareholding, and continued
government shareholding, albeit at much lower level. Cross-shareholding involves the
purchase of company shares by a stable outside group of French firms while self-
shareholding "refers to ownership of shares in a group by that group's own constituent
OECD Economic Surveys: France 1996-1997, (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, 1997), 120.
Francois Morin, "The Privatisation Process and Corporate Governance: The French Case," in Corporate
Governance, State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation, (Paris: OECD), 64.
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elements, i.e. by subsidiaries (or other firms controlled by the parent company)."90 The
recent privatization of Thomson-CSF, the defense electronics manufacturer, illustrates
both self and cross-shareholding. After privatization, Thomson-CSF owners included
Thomson SA—a state-owned holding company (33.4%), Alcatel Alsthom—a French
defense conglomerate (25%), Dassault Aviation—a private sector French aerospace firm
(5.8%), private individual investors (33%), and employees (2%). 91 France's other
defense industry flagship, Aerospatiale-Matra92
,
is evidence of even more blatant
government control. Touted by the French state as a privatization of the completely
state-owned Aerospatiale through merger with Matra Hautes Technologies, a division of
the private sector firm, Lagardere Group, Aerospatiale-Matra has instead shown the
continued insistence of the French government to stay actively involved in the industry,
even after privatization. This message was declared through its maintenance of a 47.8
percent stake in the new firm and joint statement by the Ministries of Defense, Economy,
and Transport: '"The state will remain, in a decisive manner, the first shareholder of
Aerospatiale-Matra.'"93
2. Corporate Governance Differences
The transformation of a state-owned enterprise into a privatized company reflects
not only a fundamental shift in the firm's ownership but also the owner-management
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bidding versus strategic formation, illustrates the distinct and differing natures of
corporate relations between continental Europe and the United Kingdom. The most
significant distinction, tied directly to the issue of privatization, is that of corporate
governance. Corporate governance, or the relationship of a corporate entity's owners
with its management team and resultant issues, remains a largely unique characteristic of
individual nations. The differences between national corporate governance systems,
however, have been highlighted as cross-border mergers between national manufacturers
have produced pan-national companies. In contrast to other industries, the defense
industries of the United States and Western Europe are behind in dealing with the issue.
Consolidation within the industry has occurred in the past; however, it remained largely
restricted to national markets. Cross-border participation involved joint ventures and
equity purchases, but no outright mergers of defense firms.
With state ownership seen as a major obstacle to Western European restructuring,
privatization efforts in France, Spain, and Italy have focused on decreasing the role of the
state in enterprises. As described earlier, however, privatization efforts in these nations
have uncovered fundamental differences in the way Western European governments and
companies view the owner-management relationship. While each nation maintains its
own corporate governance system, the business world has slowly seen a convergence of
various systems in Western Europe and the United States—another impact of
globalization in the corporate world. The United States remains unique in that it has no
institutionalized national system of corporate governance. Institutions such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) monitor particular national sectors, but each
state is allowed to adopt its own broad system. In Western Europe, national systems are
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prevalent but differ greatly in the details. Despite such complexity, economists often
divide governance systems into two camps.
Dr. John Harper of the U.S. General Accounting Office, in his examination of
corporate governance and corporate performance in the U.S. and European defense
industries, separated the various systems into Anglo-American and Continental European
governance.
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The OECD similarly draws a distinction between "outsider" and "insider"
systems. Diffuse ownership and high turnover of shares characterize the outsider system,
representative of the United States and the United Kingdom. In contrast, the insider
system, as seen in Germany, Japan, and other European nations, is marked by high
ownership concentration by small groups that maintain a long-term, stable relationship
with the firm. 95 Dispersed ownership in outsider systems takes the form of individual
household investors, its purest form, and institutional investors (for example, pension
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds) who provide proxy ownership. The
shareholding figures for the United States and the United Kingdom show the importance
of dispersed owners (Table l)96 . In insider systems such as Germany and France,
institutional and household investors still play a significant role, however, private
companies provide the desired ownership stability in these nations.
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Table 1 : The Structure of Shareholding in Selected Nations (% of total)
Source: Centre for European Policy Studies
GERMANY FRANCE UK US
(as at end of year) 1990 1992 1993 1992
Institutional Investors 22 23 59.3 31.2
Banks 10 0.6 0.3
Pension Funds/Insurers 12 51.5 23.9
Others (Unit trusts) 7.2 7
Households 17 34 19.3 48.1
Private Companies 42 21 4 14.1
Public Authorities 5 2 1.3
Foreign Investors 14 20 16.3 6.6
The OECD warns that it is dangerous to attempt to separate national systems into
the two camps. The most significant players in Western European defense industrial
restructuring all have differing systems that incorporate various aspects of both the
outsider and insider systems. A passage from a recent article in The Economist illustrates
these differences.
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Like Britain, the Netherlands has a large stockmarket
dominated by pension funds; unlike Britain, it shares the
principles of its corporate laws with France and two-tier
board system with Germany. Unlike France, Germany has
a tradition of collective leadership, hence the prevalence of
"speakers of the board" rather than chairmen. Unlike their
German peers, Spanish unions have no representation on
boards. And so on. 97
For the purposes of edification, however, three generalized models of corporate
governance will be examined.
Anglo-American Corporate Governance—marked by no controlling shareholder,
control of the directors by "strict enforcement of fiduciary duties" and an expected sense
of loyalty, and separated offices of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. This system
is most distinguishable by the high degree of legal protection of investors."
German Corporate Governance—marked by more concentrated shareholding (for
example, banks and insurance companies) by members who exert majority control,
control of directors performed through close monitoring by shareholders, and a
shareholders' supervisory board with creditors' and employees' representatives. 100
French Corporate Governance—marked by large shareholder concentration, cross-
shareholding by companies, and a board dominated by the President directeur general
(PDG) who assumes the role of both the Chairman and CEO. 101
a. Anglo-American Corporate Governance
The defense industries of the United States and Britain are representative
of a market-based system of corporate governance. As mentioned before, ownership
concentration within the Anglo-American system is extremely low. The widely dispersed
"Lean, Mean, European." European Business Survey, The Economist, 29 April-5 May 2000, 6.
98 OECD Economic Surveys: France 1996-1997, 111-113..
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nature of equity investments has spurred a strong legal protection of small investors. The
lack of concentrated ownership also encouraged the interest in corporate governance
itself. In the United States and Britain, concern arose from the belief that "management
was pursuing objectives other than long-term returns to shareholders, while at the same
time, managers were able to raise their own compensation in spite of poor company
performance." 102 In a system with concentrated ownership, large shareholders wield their
power against managers more easily than smaller, dispersed stakeholders. It is this
fundamental difference in types and concentration of ownership of the Anglo-American
and Continental European systems that is most prevalent when dealing with defense firms
in Western Europe.
An analysis of various national corporate governance systems will reveal a
number of advantages and disadvantages in each. The Anglo-American governance
system with its principal objective of aligning the interests of shareholders and managers
remains unlike most corporate governance systems throughout the world. With well-
developed capital markets, the United States and the United Kingdom rely on equity
investments and less on large institutional creditors. It is this arrangement that gives the
Anglo-American corporate governance system one of its greatest advantages—flexibility.
The capital market in the system is able to respond much faster than the system of
hausbanks (house banks) prevalent throughout continental Europe. 103 The result of such
a funding arrangement is the often-mentioned dispersed ownership. In the United
101 OECD Economic Surveys: France 1996-1997, 111-113.
" Joanna R. Shelton, "The Importance of Corporate Governance in OECD and Non-OECD Economies.
The Draft OECD Principles," Speech delivered at the Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative
Perspective Conference, 3 March 1999, Available HTTP: http://www.oecd.org (2 September 1999).
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Kingdom, dispersed ownership has evolved from household investors to today's proxy
ownership through pension, insurance company, and mutual fund investors (Table 2)
104
.
This is reflected in a general decline in individual household shareholders and the
subsequent increase in shareholdings by institutional investors (that is, pension funds,
insurance companies). An analysis of the British shareholding concentration numbers
also shows little reliance upon banks and industry for investment equity.
Table 2: Aggregate Share-Ownership of Listed Companies in the UK
Source: Centre for European Policy Studies
1963 1969 1975 1981 1989 1993
Pension Funds 6.4 9.0 16.8 26.7 30.6 34.2
Insurance Companies 10.0 12.2 15.9 20.5 18.6 17.3
Unit Trusts 1.3 2.9 4.1 3.6 5.9 6.6
Banks 1.3 1.7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.6
Investm. Trusts, Other 11.3 10.1 10.5 6.8 2.7 3.1
Households 56.1 49.5 39.8 30.4 22.9 19.3
Public Sector 1.5 2.6 3.6 3.0 2.0 1.3
Industry & Commerce 5.1 5.4 3.0 5.1 3.8 1.5




The flexibility and responsiveness derived from dispersed ownership also
gives an edge to companies in certain industries. With the rapid infusion of information
technology and its continual progression into the defense industry, the ability to adapt
quickly is becoming more important than stability. Traditional aerospace firms such as
Boeing and British Aerospace have sought to capitalize on this by transforming into
systems integrators for a variety of weapons platforms. Firms that can capitalize on the
quality of responsiveness will progress at the expense of traditional, stable companies.
With a shared reliance on capital markets as the funding mechanism and
dispersed ownership within both the United States and the United Kingdom, it would
logically follow that the number of equity transactions between the two nations would be
greater than the number of transactions between the U.S./U.K. and a continental
European nation more reliant on institutional creditors and concentrated ownership. The
focus on consolidation and possible transatlantic mergers makes this issue particularly
significant within the defense industry. Recent figures released by the U.S. Department
of Defense verify this logic. Between January 1998 and March 1999, British defense and
aerospace firms handled twenty-six equity transactions. Twenty of those twenty-six
transactions (77 percent) were with companies in the Anglo-American corporate
governance system. Looking at equity investments alone, the disparity between
transactions with companies in the Anglo-American corporate governance system versus
those in the Continental system, a ratio of 10 : 1, is clearly seen (Figure 2).
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The high level of financial interaction between members of the Anglo-
American corporate governance system is also represented in figures of British
investment in American defense firms. In order to work on classified DoD contracts,
defense firms with foreign owners must first receive permission from various U.S.
government agencies in the form of a security agreement. In its globalization report, the
Defense Science Board noted a "disproportionate" number of such agreements with
British firms (32) in comparison to all other foreign companies combined (31). 1 6 From
this disparity in numbers, it can be inferred that the U.S. Department of Defense is more
comfortable dealing with foreign firms that are similar to American companies.
Extended further, this argument implies that equity purchases between companies in
nations with unlike corporate governance systems will be limited until the two systems
become more similar.
Figure 2: Transactions by British Defense/Aerospace Companies
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Defense Science Board, 12.
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b. German Corporate Governance
The private nature of Germany's business community often leads many to
conclude that Germany's corporate structure is similar to that of Britain or the United
States. Germany's corporate governance system, however, remains decidedly
continental. A breakdown of the nation's ownership concentration solidifies this
contention (Table 3)
107
. The percentage of shares held by German industry has remained
relatively constant and concentrated since 1960 with percentages between 41 and 45
percent. Like Britain and the United States, Germany has seen a decline in household
shareholding. While insurance companies have grown as institutional investors, modern
dispersed ownership in the form of pension funds and mutual funds had not by 1990.
German public limited companies still remain wedded to industrial investment that acts
as a stable ownership mechanism.
While the term hausbank used to describe a relationship whereby a single
bank provides capital to a firm originated in Germany, the relative importance of banks
1 OS
as investors and board representatives has greatly declined. Nevertheless, Germany
remains representative of continental Europe with respect to funding mechanisms. The
strength of a nation's stock market is an indicator of the market's importance in providing
companies with capital. A measure of this strength, market capitalization as a percentage
of the national GDP, shows the great difference between the Anglo-American nations and
continental Europe. Figures from the Federation of European Stock Exchanges cited in





market capitalization is strongest in the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1993,
stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP in Britain was 139 percent and 83.5
percent in the United States (70.3 percent NYSE and 13.2 percent NASDAQ). In
contrast, Germany's market capitalization was 25.1 percent of the nation's GDP. 109
Though the hausbank may no longer dominate as the primary creditor, Germany's stock
markets have not yet matched the strength of those in the Anglo-American nations.
Table 3: Aggregate Share-Ownership of German Listed Companies (%)
Source: Centre for European Policy Studies
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990
Industry 44 41 45 43 42
Households 27 28 19 18 17
Foreign Investors 6 8 11 13 14
Insurance Companies 3 4 6 9 12
Banks 6 7 9 8 10
Government 14 11 10 9 5
109
Lannoo, 9-10. Other European figures: France (37.9%), Italy (15.1%), Spain (25.9%), EU 15 (43.8%),
EU minus UK (30%)
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c. French Corporate Governance
During the 1980's and 1990's, the French government agreed to
decrease its stake in nationalized firms as it began a privatization movement. As
discussed earlier however, the state's focus during its privatization efforts was not on an
eventual market-based system but strategic formation. Through the use of noyaux dur in
cross and self-shareholdings and continued state ownership, the French government has
managed to preserve the intrinsic advantage gained from concentrated ownership
—
stability. A result of such an ownership structure is that managers are shielded "from the
short-term pressures of the market by making a change in corporate control more
difficult." While protection against market forces has insulated French defense firms as
they belatedly sought to restructure and "may be conducive to long-term, relation-specific
investments," it "also weakens pressures to maximize performance." 1 10
American and British industrialists have favored the flexibility that capital
markets give them; however, their French counterparts maintain a solid, stable structure
in the face of great technological change. In theory, such stability allows the core owners
to maintain tighter control over managers. The reality, on the other hand, has often
proven to the contrary. "Core shareholders, who are meant to keep a watchful eye on
managers, often turn out to be too patient, and can be unwilling to cede control even
when it makes obvious commercial sense." 111 Stability within the ownership structure, it
has been argued, also creates a long-term vision, lower capital costs, and greater
competitiveness. Stability, in contrast, "can also hinder companies from responding
1 .0 OECD Economic Surveys: France 1996-1997, 111.
1.1
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rapidly to new technology or from easily redeploying workers from declining sectors to
growing ones" "—a strength of Anglo-American firms. As the defense industry
continues to incorporate information technology and other new technologies, Anglo-
American firms that can respond quickly will inevitably take a leadership position.
While cross-shareholding may encourage technology sharing between companies (for
example, Thomson-CSF and Alcatel Alsthom, a major shareholder in Thomson, have
negotiated a strategic partnership to transfer commercial technology from Alcatel to
Thomson 1 ] ), may help French firms respond to foreign competition, they will continue
to be inhibited. Both the receiving and donor companies are affected by the flexibility
weakness of the concentrated ownership system dominated by industry investors.
Like the German corporate governance system, industry owners play a
large role in the French ownership scheme. On an aggregate scale, industry accounted
for a 21 percent stake in French listed companies (Table 4). Within the French defense
industry, this figure is much higher. Similarly, the state's share in the defense industry is
much higher than the aggregate figure of 2 percent in 1992. Such differences merely
highlight the strategic importance of concentrated ownership by industry and government
actors not only in France but also in much of continental Europe. The OECD has often
stated that no single corporate governance system is superior to another. With respect to
the global defense industry, however, certain elements of national corporate governance
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Ownership concentration, one such element, has proven decisive in maintaining stability
in Western European defense firms and the lack of such concentration has encouraged
flexibility in Anglo-American firms. As financial figures of profitability indicate in the
next section, British firms representing the Anglo-American system of ownership outside
industrial and government circles are proving to be more profitable companies.
Table 4: Aggregate Share-Ownership of Listed Companies in France (%)
Source: Centre for European Policy Studies
1977 1992
Banks/Insurers 24 23
Private Investors 41 34




With the goal of maintaining control or influence over national armaments
producers, whether for national security or prestige reasons, governments viewed
concentrated ownership through direct state ownership as the means to the end. Even
after privatization of state-owned enterprises, influence and stability were maintained
through concentrated industrial ownership. As globalization has gradually pushed
Western Europe towards consolidation, however, the continent's corporations have
slowly evolved away from industrial ownership. In recent years, initiatives proposed by
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both international (OECD) and national bodies have sought to reform corporate
governance systems, and in the process, have encouraged nations to seek common
ground. In its 2000 European Business Survey, The Economist noted that while Europe's
corporate governance systems remain diverse, "its markets have moved much closer to
the American model over the past couple of years, albeit at different speeds." 114
On the aggregate level, institutional investors such as pension and mutual
funds have arrived and will now play a growing role in terms of both capitalization and
ownership. Western Europe is now moving toward "greater reliance on funded schemes
in the financing of retirement." Currently, British and American pension funds account
for 72 percent of total pension fund assets in the West and have looked beyond their
national borders for investment opportunities. 115 As their influence develops with
increased shareholdings, pension funds will engage in more active shareholding as
dictated by United States law 116 and British suggested codes of conduct. The inevitable
result of this push by institutional investors toward dispersed ownership by proxy is the
altering of continental European corporate governance along the lines of the Anglo-
American model. 117
3. Corporate Performance
In a statistically ideal world, a direct connection between a nation's corporate
governance system and the performance of defense firms in that country could be seen.
The fact of the matter however, is that a corporate governance system with high or low
4




U.S. pension funds are required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to "actively
monitor investments and communicate with corporate management." (Lannoo, 31-32).
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ownership concentration does not dictate the success of an individual company. As a
result, a direct comparison of defense firms to their counterparts in differing nations is
impossible, particularly when other factors such as differing accounting standards and
market foci are taken into account. Examining the financial figures of several Western
European defense firms does however, indicate an interesting trend. The figures of
operating profit/income and profit margin for British Aerospace, Aerospatiale Matra,
Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DaimlerChrysler), GEC-Marconi, and Thomson-CSF (before
the 1999 round of consolidation) offer insight into the role and influence of government
in the financial success of defense firms.
As has been established, the influence of government is a particularly
distinguishing feature of differing corporate governance systems. A number of Western
European governments still maintain influence over their national armaments production
through ownership of stock and direct representation on corporate boards of directors.
Other nations, in contrast, have removed themselves from the ownership role and assert
influence and control solely through procurement, industry regulation, and control of
exports. The financial figures from defense firms in the nations show that these
companies display the general characteristics of companies within their respective
corporate governance systems. Companies with no direct government control (that is,
state ownership) place profit maximization ahead of other concerns. From this, it can be
concluded that such systems (for example, the Anglo-American and German governance
systems) will produce more profitable companies in the post-consolidation market. This
fact, and the previously established American preference for equity purchases and joint
1
' Lannoo, 3 1
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ventures with British companies, indicates that future transatlantic equity purchases and
mergers on both the prime and sub-prime levels will involve companies with similar
corporate properties as they share the same main goal of profit maximization. Though
not necessarily affecting profit maximization, ownership concentration will also play an
important role in dictating future equity investments. Anglo-American companies,
deriving benefits from flexibility, will most likely seek partners with similar
responsiveness.
a. Operating Profit/Income
The following figures were gathered from annual financial reports and
company reports produced by Forecast International and the Teal Group and
subsequently converted to U.S. dollars using annual foreign exchange rates calculated by
the U.S. Federal Reserve. The first measure of the success of British, French, and
German aerospace and defense electronics firms is operating profit/income. Operating
profit or income is defined as profit before interest, excluding exceptional items. This
measure was chosen based on the consistency of its definition from nation to nation.
Corporations often report net income up front in their annual reports; however, this figure
does not take into account differing tax systems in different nations.
58
Aerospace Firms
Table 5: British Aerospace (BAe)
US$ Millions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Defense 632.5 770.9 868.7 980.6 1057.4
Commercial Aerospace -239.5 -186.8 -122.5 -32.8 19.9
Total 406.8 560.4 714.7 906.8 1057.4
Table 6: Aerospatiale
US$ Millions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Defense 5.8 83.3 40.2 -0.855 -1.2
Commercial Aerospace 64.1 185.7 168.0 194.0 -13.9
Total 118 30.6 129.1 143.6 182.4 69.3
Table 7: Daimler-Benz Aerospace (Dasa)





Aerospatiale total profits include operating profits/losses from helicopter sales by Eurocopter. With
Eurocopter selling both civil and military aircraft but no specific figures indicating the division, profits
were left out of the Defense and Commercial Aerospace entries but included in the total entries.
The Dasa entries represent a combination of official Dasa figures (96-98) and those from the Teal Group
(94-95). In 1996, the Teal Group cited a loss of $130 million and a profit of $249 million in 1997. While it
is difficult to ascertain the true figure due to inconsistencies in currency rates and other factors, Dasa has




US$ Millions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 406.8 334.0 479.1 593.6 692.8
Table 9: Thomson CSF
US$ Millions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 393.8 396.1 403.7 373.1 394.4
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b. Profit Margin
While operating profit/income figures are important in distinguishing the
annual financial success of aerospace and defense electronics firms in Britain, Germany,
and France, such figures are not enough to establish a pattern concerning corporate
governance systems and corporate performance. The next measure of profitability, profit
margin, provides an indication of a company's efficiency using a simple formula.
Net profitfrom operations -*- Net sales = Profit Margin
As with its previous use, operating profit was substituted for net profit to account for the
difference in national tax systems.
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Table 10: British Aerospace (BAe)
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Table 12: Daimler-Benz Aerospace
% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total -2.7 -44.7 0.37 3.6 7.2
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Table 13: GEC-Marconi
% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 9.1 7.5 9.6 10.1 7.4
Table 14: Thomson CSF
% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 6.0 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.7
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Figure 3: Operational Profit/Income (Aerospace Total)
US$ Millions
! Aerospatiale BDasa HBAe
Figure 4: Operating Profit/Income (Defense Electronics Total)
US$ Millions
Thomson CSF HGEC Marconi
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Figure 5: Profit Margin (Aerospace Total)
Aerospatiale HDasa HBAe
Figure 6: Profit Margin (Defense Electronics Total)
Percentage
%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Thomson CSF BGEC Marconi
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C. RECENT CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS
When journalists and industry analysts speak or write about the process of
consolidation in both Europe and the United States, the marriage metaphor is often
invoked to help explain the details of a merger. One British analyst even joked that good
marriages are "made in heaven, not Europe." Though repeated use has made the
comparison somewhat trite, the emphasis on mergers being more than simply uniting two
or more companies under a single board of directors remains true. A successful merger,
like a successful marriage, requires that the involved firms restructure and not simply
unite in name. The consolidation process in Western Europe is further complicated by a
number of nuances that compose the unique government-industrial relationship. For
industry, both the subtle and blatant aspects of restructuring a newly merged company
and problems associated with the process are eventually displayed in the firm's annual
report to stockholders. For both industry and government, access to domestic markets
has become increasingly important. Defense firms must now penetrate other home
markets through mergers while governments are faced with the growing antiquity of the
national champion system. With the consolidation process picking up speed and
momentum, states are also faced with the issue of declining competition in weapons
procurement. Every sector of the European defense industry has been forced to address
these issues. By examining the consolidation efforts in systems integration/aerospace,
land systems, and defense electronics sectors, the difficulties involved with such issues
while also strengthening the industrial pillar are more clearly demonstrated.
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The restructuring of the global defense industry began in the United States during
the last decade. American companies were faced with a declining U.S. defense budget
and responded by both consolidating and restructuring within the national market.
Western European defense firms have likewise begun the process of consolidation in
response to the changing security atmosphere and resultant defense budgets. European
industrial restructuring, however, has become entwined in the idea of globalization
—
intra-European and transatlantic mergers. The end of the Cold War has provided the
catalyst for the current plans at consolidation, but such restructuring is not without
precedent. Daimler-Benz Aerospace (Dasa), which recently became DaimlerChrysler
Aerospace with the merger of the Daimler-Benz conglomerate and Chrysler
Corporation,
121
traces its origins back to the fusion of Messerschmidt, Ludwig Bolkow,
Hamburger Flugzeugbau, Ernst Hrinkel, Focke-Wulf, Weser Flugzeugbau, and Rhein
Flugzeugbau. 1 "' This pattern of post-World War II mergers is also prevalent in Great
Britain and France. Unlike past restructuring efforts, however, the new era of
consolidation is also witnessing pan-European mergers with former foreign rivals.
Today's mergers within the Western European defense industry are unparalleled in both
their corporate and cultural scope.
http://defence-data.com/current/page71 13.htm (8 May 2000).
121
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possibility of future transatlantic mergers.
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1. Systems Integrators/Aerospace and Restructuring
The first major step toward European consolidation and restructuring came in
January 1999. Industry analysts and government officials took their Christmas holiday
expecting the negotiations between British Aerospace (BAe) and DaimlerChrysler
Aerospace to be completed and the formation of the first major pan-European
conglomerate to be announced in the new year. The Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported
on 7 December 1998 that British Aerospace had confirmed that '"it was at an advanced
stage of talks over a merger with European partners" and that "analysts saw the statement
as referring to a reported possible merger with DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (Dasa)."
Those outside of BAe and its new partner were shocked on 19 January 1999, however,
when British Aerospace announced that it was merging not with Dasa but with GEC-
Marconi Electronic Systems—the defense electronics division of Britain's General
Electric Company. After approval by anti-trust officials in the United Kingdom and most
recently, the U.S. Department of Defense in November 1999, the $10 billion merger was
completed. 124
With the merger blessed by the DoD and officially by the U.S. Department of
Justice, the new company announced its new name amidst great fanfare at the Banqueting
Hall in Whitehall—BAE Systems. The new moniker was touted as reflecting the
company's new global status—no longer focused completely on aerospace and no longer
a British firm. In fact, around 40 percent of the company's revenues come from non-
aerospace sectors (that is, electronics, ordnance, and naval vessels), more than 80 percent
i2j
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of the company's revenues are generated outside of Britain, and "more than one-third of
its 100,000-odd employees work outside Britain." 123 BAE Systems' chairman, Sir
Richard Evans declared, "we are immensely proud of our Britishness but as we are no
longer a British based company ... we believe that we have chosen a name that
acknowledges our proud heritage and roots but at the same time is properly in tune with
our global mix—it is time to move on."
In anticipation of its merger with GEC Marconi, British Aerospace began the
process of restructuring in July 1999. To increase productivity, company managers
launched a program to streamline manufacturing operations that included plant closures
and employment reductions. Beginning with the closure of Royal Ordnance (ammunition
division) facilities in Faldingworth and Bishopton and reductions in other manufacturing
1 77
and support activities, the managers' plan called for a reduction of 1,400 employees.
Furthermore, Sir Richard declared that the company has carefully studied the problems
encountered by Lockheed Martin during its merger. In particular, Evans believes that
BAE Systems can avoid Lockheed's concentration "on gradual integration while losing
sight of orders and projects at hand." 128 A sign that BAE Systems' managers were taking
these lessons to heart was the quick appointment of a new unitary management team.
The new company, according to chief executive John Weston, will draw upon the
124 c
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strengths of both firms. 'The combination of MES's [Marconi Electronic Systems] cost
management and financial control skills with BAe's large-scale project management and
systems integration skills will produce significant benefits." 129 As with other Anglo-
American companies, the true test of success will be BAE Systems' share price in the
stock market.
After being spurned by British Aerospace, DaimlerChrysler Aerospace began
looking for a new partner. Rumors quickly circulated about a possible transatlantic link-
up with Northrop Grumman or a merger with the French defense electronics giant,
Thomson-CSF. At the end of June, the chairman of Dasa, Manfred Bischoff, reached an
agreement with Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA) president Alberto Fernandez
Ferreras to merge the German and Spanish aerospace companies. 130 The culmination of
Dr. Bischoff s consolidation dreams, however, did not arrive until 15 October 1999. The
defense-industrial sector was once again rocked with the announcement of another major
merger within the Western European defense industry. The heads of DaimlerChrysler
Aerospace and Aerospatiale Matra officially merged their companies along with CASA
into a giant European conglomerate, the European Aeronautical, Defense and Space
Company (EADS). With combined revenues of $22.9 billion, 96,000 employees 131 , and
a combined stake of 80 percent in the Airbus Industrie consortium, EADS is poised to be
a dominating power in civil aerospace and influential in the defense sector. The
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success of the new multinational defense firm will depend in large part upon the ability of
German, French, and Spanish executives to fully integrate and orient their respective
firms'' operations with a single coherent strategy. Even with a common language and
national orientation, American defense companies have found the merger process to be
fraught with difficulties. One European consultant observed that "the differences among
the Europeans are visceral . . . not easily susceptible to logical discourse or negotiation,
and are deeply coloured by emotion and issues of national identity." 133
Added to the cultural difficulties of merging the three national aerospace firms is
a complex corporate structure that represents the interests of a variety of parties. One
such party that insisted upon a shareholding was the French state. In past attempts at
pan-European mergers with private sector firms, the French government required a
significant stake in the new company. Until the EADS deal, those firms had refused to
accept state ownership and control. The rationale behind DaimlerChrysler Aerospace's
sudden change of heart can be traced to two advantageous arrangements secured by the
Germans. First of all, Dasa's contribution to EADS will represent less than 40 percent of
the company's structure, but it will have 50 percent of the company's holding. 134
Furthermore, DaimlerChrysler chairman Jiirgen Schrempp was reportedly promised that
the French government would stay out of management decisions. If it does not live up to
this promise, Dasa has the option to back out of the deal within three years with
http://ca.dtic.miycgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Octl999/el9991015dasa.htm (15 October 1999).
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"attractive buyout terms." 133 With the addition of CASA to the mix, DaimlerChrysler
Aerospace retains a 45.75 percent stake in the company, the French government holds
22.88 percent, Lagardere maintains a 16.93 percent stake, private French investors hold
5.95 percent, and the Spanish state holding company, Sepi, will retain a 8.5 percent
holding (Figure 7).
While the issue of state ownership was one that had to be dealt with before the
merger could proceed, other difficulties still remain to be overcome. The main purpose
of any merger is to establish a stronger company through benefits such as greater
economies of scale, increased research and development capabilities, new product lines,
and in the European defense industry, greater access to the home markets of the merger
partners. To gain these benefits in a smaller and more competitive market, however, a
multinational defense firm must be willing to restructure and not simply consolidate. The
empirical example of the American defense restructuring process during the 1990's has
shown that the process requires partners whose divisions complement one another.
Where overlap occurs, the firm's managers must be willing to consolidate and cut back
personnel or production facilities if necessary. When Hughes Aircraft acquired General
Dynamics' missile division in 1992, Hughes' management "launched an aggressive
restructuring program that consolidated operations from five plants to one, reduced staff
from 14,000 to 8,000, and increased capacity utilizations from 35 percent to 85 percent,
effectively reducing unit costs by almost 40 percent, from $520,000 to $325,000."
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British Aerospace likewise downsized in anticipation of its merger with GEC Marconi.
Thus far, it remains to be seen whether the newly formed EADS management is willing
to make such hard decisions. In a scathing critique of EADS in Forbes magazine,
Howard Banks warned that EADS will not seek efficiency gains through plant closures or
a reduced workforce, for EADS "is as much a political beast as a commercial enterprise.
1 ^7
Efficiency gains aren't the objective; saving jobs is."
One method EADS has indicated will help it restructure is the pursuit of
synergies. The announcement of the last Western European holdout in the aerospace
sector, Italy's Alenia Aerospace, to form a joint venture with EADS seems to reinforce
the potential of synergy. The proposed joint venture firm, the European Military Aircraft
Company (EMAC), is to be split evenly between EADS and Alenia and will allow both
companies to consolidate their defense-related skills. A closer examination of the
companies' projects, however, shows a potential for overlap problems that could
endanger consolidation benefits. With the addition of CASA to the EADS fold, the pan-
European firm gained "a strong light transport aircraft product line in the CN-23 5/295."
The aircraft's direct competitor, the C-27J, however, is produced by the newest EADS
partner, Alenia. Alenia' s light transport aircraft division is not included in the joint
venture company, so the EADS partners will continue to compete in this important
sector. Another conflict also arises in the trainer aircraft sector. Dasa began developing
the Mako jet trainer before the EADS merger was proposed. Alenia, in conjunction with
Russia's Yakolev, has committed to produce the Ae-131 future light advanced jet





13 Which aircraft will survive has yet to be decided, however, internal conflict



















































































Figure 7: EADS Shareholder
Structure
Source: Interavia, December
1999 and Defence Data
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2. Land Systems and Domestic Markets
While the BAE Systems and EADS mergers have garnered much of the attention
surrounding Western European defense industry consolidation, a number of smaller but
still important restructuring deals have been in the works. In the aerospace sector, BAE
Systems made a £269 million equity investment in Saab. 140 Knowing that it would never
win a fighter contract in a country with a domestically produced aircraft, BAE acquired a
35 percent stake in Sweden's Saab. This strategy has seen its greatest success, however,
in the land systems sector, a sector notoriously dominated by national champions. 141 In a
presentation before European industry and government officials in January 2000, Michael
Abels, a partner in the law, accounting, and tax consultancy firm of Oppenhoff & Radler,
outlined three consolidation opportunities for European defense firms:
1
.) Merge with competitors] to neutralize and to become a
domestic firm (e.g., Dasa, CASA, and Aerospatiale Matra);
2.) Become the sole domestic supplier in as many
markets/states as possible; and
3.) Eliminate or neutralize one's own domestic
competition.
142
To gain entrance into the Scandinavian market and become a domestic supplier,
British land systems producer Alvis purchased Finland's Hagglunds in 1997. The next
year, the savvy Alvis managers decided to neutralize their domestic competition as well
140
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by acquiring a majority stake in GKN Defence. 143 In Germany, domestic market
consolidation has been particularly robust. Krauss-Maffei Wehrtechnik and Wegmann
merged to form Krauss-Maffei Wegmann in 1999. Rheinmetall DeTec likewise
strengthened its domestic market share by purchasing Henschel Wehrtechnik and KUKA
Wehrtechnik in 2000. Where mergers have not been possible or desired in the land
systems sector, cooperative teams have been established. Such cooperative efforts have
not only created economic, production, and R&D benefits, but they have also given land
systems firms access to outside markets. Currently, the two largest international projects,
the Multi-Role Armored Vehicle (MRAV) and TRACER, involve a number of Western
European and American producers. 143
3. Defense Electronics and Competition
Unlike either the aerospace or land systems sectors, the defense electronics sector
has not always garnered the same national feelings. Though it remains a vital component
of a healthy defense industry, the sector has largely been the purview of prime contractor
divisions (for example, General Electric 's Marconi division) or second tier defense
companies. In recent years, however, one titan has come to dominate the sector. The
most recently announced mergers, both initiated by this company, are significant because
of the nationalities of the involved parties. In January 2000, Thomson-CSF chairman
Denis Ranque announced that the French electronics giant had purchased Britain's Racal
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$1 billion to $2 billion and make Thomson the third largest European defense firm after
BAE Systems and EADS. 146 In May 2000, Thomson increased its presence in the British
market further by acquiring the remaining 10 percent of Pilkington Optronics. Thomson
had previously purchased 90 percent of the joint venture electro-optical company from
Pilkington pic in March 1998. 147
The purchase of a medium-sized electronics company and small joint venture firm
would normally not be particularly interesting. The apparent approval by the British
government of a well-established British manufacturer by a French corporation, however,
is significant. Ranque and Racal chairman Ernest Harrison acknowledged that the deal
had received the approval of the British Ministry of Defence. From a MoD perspective,
"Thomson's emergence as a strong counter-weight to BAE Systems on the UK defence
market could only be healthy from a competition standpoint." 148 While consolidation is
generally viewed as a positive development for the Western European defense industry,
government officials remain concerned that competition will disappear in the midst of a
merger frenzy. The American consolidation process came to an abrupt halt with the DoD
denial of Lockheed Martin's proposed merger with Northrop Grumman on the basis of
maintaining competition within the tactical aircraft market. With a similarly strong
tradition of competition for military contracts firmly established in the United Kingdom,
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electronics contender, even if that rival is a French firm. As mergers and equity
investments continue in the coming years, competition, or lack thereof, will become a
serious issue in Western Europe as it has in the United States. With the power to accept
or deny defense industry agreements, national governments will exercise great power in
order to preserve procurement choice. Industry executives will undoubtedly have to take
this into account before proceeding with future consolidation efforts.
D. OBSTACLES TO INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
While Western Europe has in large part embraced the consolidation of its defense
industry, acceptance of the necessary restructuring efforts remains uncertain. In the
Anglo-American corporate environment, company officials must continually deal with
employment issues and labor unions. Government interference in the employment
structure, however, remains limited in these nations. Likewise, the power of labor unions
is restricted. With socialist legislators seeking to rebuild the national economy and labor
unions wielding greater power, the focus on employment and labor issues presents a
serious obstacle to restructuring efforts within the continental defense industry. The last
vestiges of national armaments programs further inhibit such efforts at restructuring.
Though such obstacles are culturally entrenched in nations such as France and Germany,
the means to overcome them have recently arrived.
1. Focus on Employment
The unique aspects of national corporate governance systems in France and
Germany are seen not only in issues such as ownership concentration but also in the
focus placed on employment within the national economy. For Europeans in general and
the French in particular, the issue of employment is one of great importance. In 1996, the
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unemployment rate in France rose to 12.5 percent. In November 1998, the OECD
reported a decrease to 11.5 percent, however the decrease was tempered by figures
indicating that long-term unemployment continues to grow and "now stands at over 40
1 40
per cent. ' When faced with such an alarming unemployment rate, the French state's
natural inclination has been to interfere in the operation of businesses. As the decline in
employment began in the early 1990's, the French government encouraged companies to
reduce working hours in order produce more jobs. Such efforts would culminate in
passage of the Law of June 1998 that decreased weekly work hours from 39 hours to 35
hours. As OECD economists have indicated, however,
To establish a virtuous circle of working time reduction and
job creation without any marked deterioration in
competitiveness and public finances, substantial scope for
productivity gains must exist and be tapped and the social
partners [unions] must agree on a marked moderation of
wage developments. 151
Within the French defense industry, revenues and productivity growth have been unable
to promote the "virtuous circle". Since 1990, "domestic revenues for French defense
firms have fallen some 35 percent" and are now "equivalent to 63 percent of their total
sales." Faced with such figures, the firms "have no choice but to enter the global
marketplace and form international partnerships to survive." 152 Productivity growth for
French aerospace firms during the 1990's was 2.2 percent. Such growth is
overshadowed, however, by growth rates of 8.8 percent in the United States and 6.9
149 OECD Economic Surveys: France 1998-1999, (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, 1999), 37.
150 OECD Economic Surveys: France 1998-1999, 14.
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percent in the United Kingdom. 153 For the French defense industry, the reduction in the
weekly working hours has not created jobs but instead, placed many in danger. French
companies such as Thomson-CSF and Dassault have proven themselves to be global
competitors. Such companies must, however, have the freedom to adapt to the changing
European and global market if they are to continue to succeed.
Though France has similarly strong labor protection laws, the German labor
system has come to symbolize the strength of the European labor movement. With
wages more than $10 more per hour than American salaries 154 and representation on
corporate supervisory boards enshrined in the national corporate governance system,
German labor plays a dominant role in industrial and economic affairs. As restructuring
efforts begin to pick up speed in Germany, they will undoubtedly run into opposition
from unions. Within the German aerospace sector, productivity growth declined
dramatically from 1991 to 1995 while an opposite trend was seen in the United Kingdom.
While German firms managed to reduce "employment significantly, the reduction was
not sufficient to counteract the reduction in sales until 1996."
155 As productivity growth
rates rose dramatically in the United States and Britain, the Germans achieved a
disappointing 1.7 percent growth rate, below the 2.4 percent rate for the rest of Europe
(minus France and the UK). 156 If German and French defense firms seek to compete in
the global arms market, they will need to cut back excess employment and infrastructure.
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The will and power of unions to block such efforts could prove to be major obstacles to
industrial restructuring. Surprisingly, the means to overcome the labor obstacle could
come from the labor unions themselves. In its 2000 European Business Survey, The
Economist remarked that unions have become more tolerant of European restructuring
efforts. Peter Coldrick, a senior official at the European Trade Union Confederation,
went so far as to declare, '"We understand that things are changing and that you can't
regulate today's market into submission.'" 157
2. Article 296
While the process of restructuring began in earnest with the merger of British
Aerospace and GEC Marconi in January 1999, it remains incomplete. Many European
defense companies remain protected by their nations' support for their "national
champions." As with some officials in the U.S. government, some within European
governments still cling to the traditional belief that the ability to produce weapons must
not be ceded to foreigners. This belief is backed up by subsidies and protectionist
legislation for national firms. Such legislation, despite the European Union's common
market, is legal under Article 296 of the founding Treaty of Rome. 159 The article states:
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1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the
application of the following rules:
(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information
the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential
interests of its security;
(b) Any Member State may take such measures as it
considers necessary for the protection of the essential
interests of its security which are connected with the
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material;
such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market regarding products
which are not intended for specifically military purposes.
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission, make changes to the list, which it
drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the
provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply.
160
While Article 296 is supported strongly by the smaller European Union members
such as Greece and Portugal, it has caused frustration for the largest defense firms. Sir
Geoffrey Pattie, former Chairman and Marketing Director of GEC Marconi, reiterated
industry frustrations with national policies at a Euroforum seminar when he announced,
"we have companies in Europe that are close to world-class status but can't get there
because a government next door blocks its expansion." 161 Article 296 has likewise
inhibited the European Commission's Directorate General Enterprise, the division
responsible for investigating potential anti-competitive practices. "One of the
Commission's main stated objectives is to extend the application of the Single Market to
160
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the defence sector," but the EU continues to be thwarted by "the resistance of many states
to cede to the Commission's competence in defence industrial issues . . . ," 162
The EU Directorate General Enterprise has seized upon the issue of industrial
base integration and intra-community export controls. According to Mr. Costas
Andropoulos, Head of Unit in the DG Enterprise, the European Commission has slowly
made progress in its efforts to retire Article 296. Having placed the defense industry and
intra-community transfers on the industrial and political agendas, an achievement that
was "far from self-evident just a few years ago," the European Commission is currently
working on a legislative proposal to harmonize rules governing arms transfers within the
European Union. The Commission's proposal calls for a "global licence system" that
"would insure that transfers could take place between the designated companies without
any additional control either in the country of origin or the country of destination."
163
The Global Licence System is perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the European
Commission's fourteen-point Action Plan for defense industry integration within the
European Union. The plan's departure from traditional sovereignty has created
opposition from nations that seek to protect their national manufacturers. French defense
officials have indicated that they would like to see common European Union guidelines
for intra-community transfer. A compromise that would maintain Article 296 as a




Costas Andropoulos, Head of Unit, Directorate General Enterprise, European Commission, "EC
Initiatives to Maintain Competitive European Defence Industries," Reshaping Business Strategies in the
European Defence Industry Conference, 24-25 January 2000, The Park Lane Hotel, London.
84
the community is the desired end result. 164 A system that enforces free movement of
defense goods within the European Union while also advocating protection of national
markets, however, is inherently contradictory. With the confusing nature of current
negotiations, a repeal or alteration of Article 296 seems highly unlikely in the near future.
Major Patrick Lefort (DGA), Assistant Defense Cooperation Attache, Embassy of France, Personal
Interview, 19 May 2000.
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III. PROSPECTS FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION
A. GLOBALIZATION OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
In an attempt to answer many of the questions concerning globalization, its
impact on U.S. security, and solutions to cooperative obstacles, the Department of
Defense formed three committees to examine the key issues of globalization and
commercialization and the reforms necessitated by both. One of the committees, the
Strategic Studies Group IV, a collection of senior military officers, was tasked with an
assignment entitled, "The Impact of Globalization and Streamlined Business Practices on
National Security." Captain Paul Ryan, a member of the Secretary of Defense's Strategic
Studies Group, stated that globalization "raises significant security concerns (protection
of classified US military specs/information)" and "could lead to proliferation of advanced
technology." 165 Such concerns have driven the SDSSG study in the face of European
calls for an immediate DoD stance on the globalization within the defense industry.
Given the problems created by the current system, finding the correct balance between
desired reforms and necessary security measures has taken on an increased importance
and is essential to gain the benefits of globalization, including transatlantic cooperative
efforts and mergers.
Despite such misgivings, the United States must be prepared to work with all of
its NATO allies through a regulated security system that accepts the facts of globalization
and its impacts on transatlantic cooperation. With the acceptance of the Defense Science
Board's conclusions concerning globalization and acceptance of security reforms by both
87
the Defense and State Departments, progress toward increased transatlantic cooperation
and mergers can be made. Unfortunately, the security cultures within the two
departments along with some in the U.S. Congress will oppose such reforms. '"Left
unattended, the existing regulatory structures will offer a robust set of barriers to
globalization,'"
166
and the transatlantic defense-industrial relationship will be severely
weakened. Though the process will be difficult, the Department of Defense must get its
house in order for cooperative projects and transatlantic mergers to be possible.
While the Department of Defense recognized the effects of globalization early on,
the DoD did not take true action until February 2000. On 5 February 2000, U.S.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen and British Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey
Hoon signed a framework agreement that represents a groundbreaking attempt to
harmonize U.S. and U.K. policy on the issues of military requirements, research and
development, acquisition procedures, supply security, export procedures, industrial
security, corporate governance and ownership, technical information, and promotion of
defense trade. The agreement, officially entitled, the "Declaration of Principles for
Defense Equipment and Industrial Cooperation" (DoP), capitalized on the already well-
established "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom.
For the United States, the DoP represents an opportunity to formulate a "common
understanding, a common philosophy of defense industrial conduct" with a trusted
ally.
167
For the British, the Declaration of Principles is a means to finally level the
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playing field of defense competition in the United States. In the opening passage of the
DoP, the "intention that U.K. industry doing business in the United States will be treated
no less favorably than U.S. industry doing business in the United Kingdom." is
emphasized. 168
Mr. Steve McCarthy, Defence Supply Attache at the British Embassy in
Washington D.C. and the only British official to attend all DoP negotiation sessions,
wrote a short document to summarize the recent agreement. According to Mr. McCarthy,
the key points of the DoP include:
• Requirements: The two Defence departments commit to seek better means to
harmonise military requirements, using existing fora wherever practicable. This
is intended to boost efforts within NATO and other arenas to identify potential co-
operative programmes at the earliest stages, before thinking has hardened.
• Research & Development: We reconfirm our intention to identify projects at an
early stage for enhanced co-operative research, development, production and
procurement. The UK/US defence research relationship is already extensive and
is of significant benefit to both sides.
• Acquisition Procedures: Work is to be done on the possibility of harmonising
procedures for defence materiel acquisition. When co-operative programmes
have been established, differing US and UK acquisition practices can lead to
problems. The relationship of the UK's Smart Procurement initiative and the
DoD's Acquisition Reform process is also relevant.
• Security of Supply: The two nations will seek to establish means of achieving
assurance of supply for defence materiel for both of our nations, including where
appropriate mechanisms that might be legally binding.
• Export Procedures: The DoD and MoD will explore means to achieve greater
transparency and efficiency in our national defence export procedures, in
particularly looking to simplify procedures for the export of defence items
between ourselves, to establish lists of acceptable export destinations for jointly
developed equipment, to implement regulations covering exports to third parties
in a spirit of co-operation and to pursue measures to harmonise conventional arms
export policies as far as possible. A high-level council will be established to
pursue the accomplishment of these measures.
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Industrial Security: The MoD and DoD will pursue more efficient arrangements
for industrial security committing to try to avoid placing unnecessary restrictions
on the movement of staff, information or materiel between the UK and the US
and between our industries. Practical changes such as expedited transmission of
classified information; reduced administrative requirements and streamlined visit
approval processes will be addressed in order to lessen the administrative burdens
placed on UK and US companies through necessary security restrictions.
Ownership and Corporate Governance: The DoP commits defence ministries
to encouraging the freest possible cross-border investment in defence-related
industry. The DoP commits the Defence Departments not to impose unreasonable
or unnecessary security restrictions on corporate governance while considering
the security implications of any proposed international merger or acquisition.
Technical Information: The two sides will explore means of improving
arrangements for the use and handling of technical information between them and
between their industries and to seek to optimize the exploitation for defence of
technology investments. Arrangements will be established to facilitate the
efficient operation ofUK and US companies doing business in the other nation by
improving the arrangements for disclosure, transfer and use of technical
information.
Promoting Defence Trade: The DoD and the MoD will endeavor, on a
reciprocal basis, to diminish legislative and regulatory impediments to optimising
market competition and to explore means to eliminate laws, regulations, practices
and policies that require or favour national industrial participation in defence
acquisition. They will work to revise acquisition practices in order to remove
impediments to efficient global market operations and to support international
market access for each other's companies. They agree to give full consideration
to all qualified sources in each other's companies. 169
B. AMERICAN OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION
Since General John "Black Jack" Pershing sailed for France with the American
Expeditionary Force in 1918, the United States has been intimately involved in European
affairs. Following World War II, the U.S. solidified its involvement by helping to
establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. NATO has successfully carried
out its main mission since 1949: "Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the
169
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Germans down." 170 Through initiatives such as the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) within NATO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as
the central European Union policy to address common European security issues, Europe
has sought to extend its security role and to escape complete reliance upon U.S. military
power. While it is safe to assume that the United States will remain actively involved in
European security, the best time to ensure that European security aspirations remain
"separable but not separate"
171
is at their inception.
An essential component of the transatlantic relationship now and in the future will
be the defense-industrial base. As the recent mergers have shown, Western European
governments and industry executives are in the early stages of building the industrial
component of a newly independent European defense capability. In recognition of the
importance of the defense-industrial link, U.S. Department of Defense officials such as
former Deputy Secretary John Hamre and Under Secretary Jacques Gansler have sought
to consummate the current relationship through more collaborative efforts and even
transatlantic mergers with American prime contractors. For the past several years, DoD
and European officials have viewed consolidation as the best vehicle to bring the
European industry up to a level near that of the newly restructured U.S. firms. With the
overall goal of increasing Western European military capabilities, the U.S. Department of
Defense openly encouraged consolidation in the Western European arms industry. In a
1998 speech at the 25 th International NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision
Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, is often credited with this personal motto.
171
The phrase '"separable but not separate" was first used in a North Atlantic Conference communique
announcing the decision to formulate Combined Joint Task Forces at the January 1994 NATO summit.
91
Making in Vienna, Under Secretary Gansler noted, "consolidation will certainly increase
European firms' competitiveness and capacity for independent action." 172
Many European officials similarly saw consolidation as a means to ensure a
competitive global market. They felt, however, that the U.S. vision, particularly
Secretary Hamre's, foresaw stronger U.S. primes acquiring their weaker European
counterparts. Consolidation, in the minds of Western European industrialists and
government officials, could help ensure that any transatlantic mergers would involve
equal partners. Despite differing motives for encouraging consolidation, the end goal of
transatlantic mergers has remained a distinct possibility. The Department of Defense has
remained supportive of consolidation that will lead to eventual mergers with U.S. firms,
but it has not ensured that obstacles to transatlantic cooperation and mergers are removed.
In September 1998, John Weston, chief executive of British Aerospace, alluded to
such obstacles when he declared that "the U.S. link is essential, but the timing for that
link will be dictated by the point that the U.S. government and the U.S. Defense
Department feels comfortable dealing with an international contractor . . . ." The point
of comfort for the Department of Defense in large part hinges on a perceived threat to
security posed by foreign defense companies. As a result, industrial security, along with
foreign investment concerns and export policies, remains a great concern of the United
States and the chief obstacle to transatlantic cooperation and mergers. The proper
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response to such concerns should be a carefully devised defense trade system that
protects U.S. interests while also encouraging transatlantic cooperation. The actual
result, however, has been the construction of administrative and legislative barriers.
1. Foreign Investment in the U.S. Defense Market
Foreign investment in general has been the subject of both praise and sharp
criticism in the United States. In the U.S. defense industry, a more neutral but cautious
attitude has prevailed. As has been established, the unique nature of the industry's
clientele and products require greater government regulation of the industry in all nations.
Investment by foreign companies within the American defense-industrial base, as a
consequence, requires careful scrutiny by federal regulatory agencies. Section 721 of the
1988 Defense Production Act, also known as the Exon-Florio Act, gives authority to the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to investigate the
national security repercussions of mergers with or acquisitions of U.S. companies
performing defense related work by foreign firms. 174
Though it is not mandatory for a foreign firm to notify CFIUS of a potential
investment, the government has the right to invoke divestment or other penalties on a
company that was not properly vetted under the national security review process. If
notice is given to CFIUS, the committee has thirty days to review the national security
implications of the proposed deal. If concerns are raised during the initial review, the
committee will conduct a forty-five day investigation followed by a recommendation as
174
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to the acceptance or denial of the investment to the President. According to a
memorandum prepared for the British Defence Supply Office by the Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays, & Handler consultancy firm, in the hundreds of reviews CFIUS has
handled since 1988, few have required the full investigation and only one acquisition has
been blocked. 175
Despite the established protocol for CFIUS reviews and a history of approvals,
the foreign investment review system could create problems if future merger or
acquisition requests rise above the level of third and second-tier defense firms. In its
guide to U.S. export controls, the consultancy firm of Holland & Knight advises British
corporations, "while small non-defence acquisitions may proceed quickly, large
acquisitions, particularly in the defence sector will take considerably more time." 176 To
complicate matters further, the Defense Science Board noted in its globalization study,
"in some cases, when one or more agencies participating in the CFIUS review are unable
to complete their review, an investigation is often undertaken. The entire process can
take 90 days to complete." In a business atmosphere where currency value is in a
constant state of flux and timing can be a key determining factor in investments, a three-
month delay could strangle future transatlantic equity investments, acquisitions, or
mergers.
Past attempts at foreign investment in the U.S. defense industry have remained
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the American arms market, however, equity investments in or outright acquisition of
large U.S. contractors could arise. Whether the issue is such investments, future
government-sponsored defense projects, or arms exports, the question of with whom to
cooperate arises. While still at the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Hamre acknowledged that
the DoD "plans to classify international mergers as preferred, restricted, or forbidden." 177
Hamre suggested that Canada, Norway, Australia, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom were on the preferred list while Russia and China could be found on the
forbidden list. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the listings was the absence of
1 78
Germany and France from the preferred list. Past concerns of their export to third
nations is often given as rationale. Given such a public announcement of potential
defense-industrial pariahs, some analysts have questioned the status of preferred
nationality companies with ties to restricted firms. 175 Both British Aerospace and GEC
Marconi are involved in joint ventures with French companies. Nick Cunningham, an
analyst with Saloman Smith Barney, summed up many questions when he asked, '"Is
there an acceptable percentage of Frenchness, or are these companies already
condemned?'" 180 The situation is further complicated by DaimlerChrysler's status as a
truly transatlantic company. European industry and government officials insist that the
official tiered policy has been revoked. Lack of an "official" policy, however, does not
remove personal prejudice. As Richard Perle, now an advisor to the probable GOP-
presidential candidate George W. Bush, told a German DaimlerChrysler executive, "'You
1
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have thrown your lot in with the French, and to be perfectly blunt about it, we don't trust
the French. I don't trust them to do deals with. I think you'll find us more restrictive
now.'"
181
Despite such misgivings, the Department of Defense has committed to expanding
the U.S. industrial base through bilateral agreements with Western European and other
nations. The Declaration of Principles with the United Kingdom is viewed as the first of
a series of agreements based on the DoD's "Five Pillars" of industrial base globalization:
Industnal Security, Export Controls, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, and Reciprocity.
With a precedent-setting agreement completed, the Department of Defense has opened up
negotiations with France and Germany and to a lesser extent, Italy, Norway and
Sweden. 183 A German Declaration of Principles appears to be the closest to fruition, with
working groups in areas such as industrial security established. Negotiations began in
August 1999 between the German armaments director and Under Secretary Jacques
Gansler. The next round was completed in January 2000. 184 Though an official
agreement is not immediately expected, the negotiations provide hope that security
concerns can be assuaged through an established framework and that such an agreement
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2. Industrial Security
While the end of the Cold War has brought about massive changes in force
structure and procurement budgets, the relatively sturdy wall of security policy that
governs the issues of globalization and transatlantic cooperation has been left largely
intact. The rationale for maintaining Cold War levels of security have been reinforced by
allegations of Chinese espionage inside U.S. nuclear laboratories and the transfer of
satellite technology to China. The subsequent Cox Report has further politicized the
issues of industrial security and arms exports and has ensured that government agencies
and the U.S. Congress will scrutinize any relaxation of security standards, even for
NATO members. Despite the added difficulties, the Department of Defense must work
carefully to reconfigure the industrial security apparatus to protect vital areas (for
example, nuclear, cryptographic, and satellite technology) and open up others to
globalization while taking into account the changes that information technology have
wrought. The current industrial security arrangements remain focused on the control of
physical access (for example, access to facilities, restricted areas, and photocopiers).
Restrictive arms export regulations and refusal to share information and technology with
key allies may give the perception of a strong security policy, but such policies also hurt
efforts to increase the interoperability of European forces and poison cooperative efforts.
Peter Scaruppe, Counselor, Defense Research and Engineering (Economics), Embassy of the Federal
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The United States has traditionally allowed foreign-owned, controlled, or
influenced (FOCI) companies to conduct business within its borders if such influence and
control is eliminated or mitigated by a special security agreement. Based on the level of
foreign involvement, an agreement will allow a company to operate as a U.S. company
with a facility security clearance (FCL). "FOCI agreements are designed to ensure that
the foreign parent company cannot access either classified or export-controlled
unclassified information/' The responsibility for implementing these security agreements
"is placed with U.S. citizens responsible for managing the foreign owned subsidiary."
If foreign interest in a company is such that it is not entitled to representation on the
board of directors, a board resolution that excludes foreign access to classified or export-
controlled information and ensures no influence over the performance of classified work
will suffice. If the foreign interest has board representation but still controls less than
fifty percent of the company's shares, a security control agreement (SCA) must be
negotiated with the government. Such an agreement stipulates, "at least one member of
the board must be a cleared, disinterested, independent director approved by the CSA
[cognizant security agency], and all the principal officers and the chairman of the board
must be cleared U.S. citizens."
189
If a foreign interest maintains a majority stake in the U.S. company, the company
must formulate a voting trust, proxy agreement, or special security agreement in order to
gain a facility security clearance. In a voting trust, the foreign owner "transfers legal title
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of the U.S. company's stock to three Voting Trustees under a Trust Agreement" whereas
in a proxy agreement, voting rights are transferred to three proxy holders but the
company's title remains with the owner. In both cases, the owner's representatives must
be U.S. citizens able to hold security clearances. The final method of mitigating FOCI is
also the most advantageous to foreign owners. A special security agreement (SSA)
allows the foreign owner to maintain a minority representation on the board through
"Inside Directors." At least three "Outside Directors," along with company officers,
balance foreign representation on the board. Through an SSA, foreign owners can
preserve their shareholder rights and the company can work on classified projects. 1
Despite all such security agreements, the fear of a FOCI firm obtaining restricted
information remains a real, if unwarranted, fear. The Defense Science Board reported in
1999 that compliance with security regulations has been higher in FOCI firms than in U.S
national companies. 191
As indicated by the high level of compliance, the security agreements for foreign
firms have in large part ensured the protection of classified or exportable information. It
is in the inner workings of such agreements, however, that problems are discovered. The
Department of Defense guidelines for FOCI companies, the National Industrial Security
Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), specify not only the security arrangements but
also when "proscribed information," 192 that is information pertinent to a defense contract,
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can be released to a U.S. subsidiary. Such information can only be released when a firm
has received a favorable national interest determination (NID). Access is granted given
evidence that release of information to a FOCI firm '"advances the national security
interests of the United States.'" As the Defense Science Board argued, however,
In practice, some government officials hold to the view that
NIDs may only be granted in extraordinary circumstances
where the national interest requires utilization of the SSA-
cleared entity because no U.S.-owned and controlled firm
can be found to perform the work. This view is
inconsistent with the NISPOM provisions .... An agency
need not demonstrate the national interests "requires"
utilization of the SSA firm, but only that the national
interest would be "advanced" by release of the
information—that is, that the national interest is advanced
by possible award of the contract to the SSA cleared
firm.
193
Without access to information, FOCI firms cannot compete with U.S. firms, and
as a result, the inherent benefits of open competition are lost. For the U.S. national
industrial security system to be successful, the current special security arrangements
should be fully and correctly implemented. An ingrained bias against FOCI firms that
was created and perpetuated by misconceptions of U.S. defense industrial policy must be
eliminated through education and transparency. As it stands now, "there is no reason to
believe that the current NID process does anything more than restrict competition for
>il94government contracts.
For a demonstrative display of the difficulties the American industrial security
system has created in recent years, one has to look no further than the Medium Extended
Air Defense System (MEADS) project, the DoD's often cited example of transatlantic
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collaboration. MEADS has been jeopardized by U.S. insistence upon "black boxes" to
protect American technology 193 and a general sense of apathy towards solving this
contentious issue. The "physical or electronic barriers designed to prevent either
tampering or theft of highly sensitive technology" have long angered U.S. allies. In the
past, such black boxes were installed for maintenance purposes, but now many feel the
barriers reflect a lack of trust in allies. Manfred Opel, a top Social Democrat on the
Bundestag Defense Committee and retired German Air Force Brigadier General 196
,
sharply commented, '"The Americans have repeatedly offered joint development of
projects, but when it comes down to the execution, they insist on black boxes. We aren't
playing this game any longer.'" 197 Solidifying the German case against the technology
barriers, Colonel John Como, director for missile programs in the office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, added that "some of
the technology the Pentagon is concerned with protecting is 'not really cutting edge
anymore' and may 'not need to be protected.'" 198 Issues such as the MEADS and now
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system disputes 199 over black boxes clearly
demonstrate the costs to the United States as a result of its current security regulations.
The United States is quickly losing its credibility as it encourages a closer industrial
relationship while at the same time blocking current and future collaborative efforts.
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3. Arms Export Restrictions
While industrial security issues have often hampered Western European defense
firms' entrance into the U.S. market, American export regulations have prevented
weapons technology from leaving the market. With noble intentions of preventing the
transfer of arms to undesirable nations, the U.S. Department of Defense and Department
of State established an elaborate system of arms export controls known as the
International Traffic and Arms Regulations (ITAR). Both the Defense and State
Departments must approve sales of defense products found on the U.S. Munitions
Control List. In February 2000, Secretary of Defense William Cohen sent Secretary of
State Madeline Albright a memo entitled, "Export Controls: The Way Ahead." In the
memo, Secretary Cohen outlined the DoD's proposal for extending ITAR exemptions to
encompass NATO and other selected allies. 200 Such a proposal would not only simplify
and speed up the process of transferring arms technology to nations whom the U.S. has
already committed to defend in times of war, it would also encourage other allies to not
only reciprocate this action but encourage transatlantic cooperation and trade as well.
In November 1999, a demonstration of what the United States can expect in the
future from a continuation of Cold War-era regulations was leaked to Defense News.
DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, faced with the continued antiquity and difficulties of the
American export-control process, declared in an internal memorandum that
102
Because of this uncertain export-license situation, with the
exception of certain government-to-government
cooperative projects, the use of U.S. goods, especially U.S.
defense goods, should be avoided at all costs . . . Whenever
U.S. goods are being used, they should be substituted as
quickly as possible with non-U.S. goods."
Reacting to the Dasa directive, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics David Oliver acknowledged, '"it has been our
policy to do this in a deliberately stupid manner,'" and that '"unless we hurry really,
really fast, we're going to be overwhelmed, because we have a pragmatic demonstration
that the current system is both inadequate and inappropriate.'" Peter Scaruppe,
Counselor for Defense Research and Engineering at the German embassy in Washington,
D.C., commented that while he hopes the Dasa decision is a one-time occurrence,
problems associated with exporting relatively mundane components found on the ITAR
list are the most commonly reported by German manufacturers.
Recent months have witnessed other efforts to enact both security and arms export
control reforms. In June 1999, the Defense Science Board's globalization task force
released a draft report that called for sweeping changes in security regulations and export
licenses.
204
The DSB task force declares that "defense industry's transformation into a
global industry, like telecommunications, is a fact," and that "this entails several major
shifts in business practices that affect both the ability of the Pentagon to protect
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technology and the way DoD acquires weaponry."203 While calling on the DoD to
acknowledge the effects of globalization, the DSB report also calls for concrete changes
to existing policy. On a similar tack as Secretary Cohen's ITAR exemption plan, the task
force recommends "major European firms be granted a blanket license for a fixed time
period that would cover the export of all weaponry now regulated under the U.S. State
Department's Munitions Control List of sensitive military technology."206
In tandem with the Defense Science Board's recommendations but more
executable in the near-term given the current atmosphere of apprehension concerning
security, a policy draft document, "endorsed by senior officials from all relevant
Pentagon agencies," advocates exceptions and waivers for export licenses, a more
streamlined review process, and identification of those technologies on the Munitions
Control List that no longer require control.
207
These initial attempts at arms export
reforms were bolstered in December 1999. A memo drafted by Principal Deputy Under
Secretary (Policy) James Bodner and Principal Deputy Under Secretary David Oliver for
the undersecretaries of the U.S. Navy, Army, and Air Force directs the selection of one
executive within each service secretariat to coordinate export control, foreign disclosure
of classified information, Foreign Military Sales, and cooperative research and
development agreements. The goal of this new policy is to produce consistency across
the three services, speed up the process, and with the discovery that important decisions
were being made by inexperienced people, ensure that qualified officials are in place. As
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Oliver joked, '"Do you want to have a 23-year-old lieutenant deciding our arms export
policy...."209
While reforms are underway which will help ease arms export controls with
trusted Western European allies, another contentious issue has continued to arise—U.S.
insistence of extraterritoriality. The United States maintains that U.S. export controls are
still in effect once U.S. goods or technology have left the country. Even foreign-
produced systems or technology are subject to U.S. export controls. "In both these
instances, often the U.S. government maintains that it continues to have jurisdiction and
control over such items and may seek to punish attempts to disregard its law." In
response, even close allies such as Britain reject "the claimed extra-territorial effect of
U.S. export control law."
210
Intransigence on this legal issue would lead to open disputes
and little cooperation on export policy. Fortunately, the Declaration of Principles with
the United Kingdom produced somewhat of a compromise that can be used as a model
for future sovereignty versus extraterritoriality disputes. Steve McCarthy described the
U.S./U.K. policy as a series of concentric circles: At the center is the agreement that
licensing should be minimal between the United States and Britain; in the second circle is
the decision to produce "white lists" of nations eligible to purchase jointly produced
systems in contrast to "black lists"; and in the third circle is the voluntary agreement on
export controls—the United States requests Britain not to re-export U.S. technology but
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the United Kingdom is not legally bound to do so. 211 With other more pressing legal
issues to resolve, compromise on this perceived threat to national sovereignty is
necessary for cooperation on arms export policy.
4. Legislative Obstacles
While security-related issues have dominated the list of cooperation obstacles, the
legal restrictions to Western European defense goods and services are mentioned nearly
as often. Invoking the national security protectionist mantra, the U.S. Congress and
Department of Defense acquisition officials have in the past often opposed opening up all
tiers of the U.S. defense market to foreign competitors, even trusted NATO allies. To
guide their decisions of whether to restrict contracts from foreign competition, the
Department of Defense uses a handbook
—
Assessing Defense Industrial Capabilities: A
DOD Handbook. The handbook stipulates that limitations should be placed on foreign
sources to
(1) avoid dependence on a politically unreliable foreign
supplier or (2) protect technologies and products that are
classified, offer unique war-fighting superiority, or can
enable foreign governments to develop countermeasures
that could undermine the effectiveness of U.S. systems.
For trade with Western European NATO members, the first stipulation should not apply.
Disagreements between the United States and its Western European allies may
occasionally emerge, but it would be difficult to attach the label "politically unreliable
foreign supplier" to any of these nations or their defense companies. Given the
211
Mr. Steve McCarthy, Attache Defence Supply, British Defence Staff, British Embassy, Washington,
D.C., Personal Interview, 18 May 2000.
106
Department of Defense's desire to foster interoperability and the domination of "unique
war-fighting" technologies by U.S. firms, the second proviso should likewise not apply
to most NATO allies.
Even if one were to argue that the Department of Defense must protect U.S.
secrets from British, French, or German arms producers, it is difficult to justify many of
the actual restrictions that are currently in place. A simple survey of the administrative
and Congressionally-mandated restrictions placed on DoD contracts shows that many of
the contracts offered only to domestic suppliers remain well outside of the "Top Secret"
realm. A report prepared by the General Accounting Office for Senator John McCain (R-
Ariz.) studied the limitations imposed by Department of Defense policy and 10 U.S.C.
2534. The GAO list of items currently restricted by 10 U.S.C. 2534 includes buses, ball
bearings, anchor and mooring chains, totally enclosed lifeboats, and marine gyroscopes.
The rationale given for restrictions on such items reflects not a desire to protect national
secrets but to protect the national industrial base against cheaper foreign suppliers. A
cynical observer would declare that such restrictions were simply attempts by
Congressmen to protect firms in their constituencies and would probably be close to the
mark in many of restriction instances. 214 To its credit, the Department of Defense has
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U.S. firms currently hold a near national monopoly on defense technologies such as stealth and GPS
munitions guidance. As a result, American companies will likely continue to dominate DoD competitions
for the production of systems utilizing such technologies.
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Though drawing no conclusions, the GAO's citation of the anchor chain example reflects Congressional
influence. Under U.S. law [10 U.S.C. 2500(1)], Canada is considered part of the national technology and
industrial base. The Defense Appropriations Acts of 1989 and 1998, however, effectively eliminate
Canadian competition by stipulating that anchor chains must be acquired from U.S. sources and
manufactured in the United States. Such legislation protects the two U.S. suppliers of anchor chain.
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sought to administratively correct such restrictions. In 1995, the DoD "initiated actions
to eliminate agency wide domestic source restrictions imposed by DoD policy," in order
to "take advantage of more competitive global markets when consistent with national
security requirements."213
While affecting relatively mundane defense articles at lower tiers than the most
expensive and sophisticated weapons systems, domestic source restrictions nonetheless
give the perception of a closed market to the United States' Western European allies. At
the heart of the United States" structural obstacles and this perception is the Buy
American Act of 1933. The Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. § 10a) states that
The Federal Government is required to buy domestic products unless such
purchases are:
(1) inconsistent with the public interest;
(2) unreasonable in cost;
(3) for use outside the United States; or
(4) of products not produced or manufactured in the United States
in sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities and
of satisfactory quality. 216
An amendment in 1988 strengthened the original act but allowed for exemptions
given by the head of a federal agency (for example, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary
of the Army, Navy, or Air Force). The exemptions to the Buy American Act are enacted
through Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with individual nations. Fortunately for
transatlantic cooperation, the NATO nations have received blanket exemptions through
215
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Source Restrictions," July 1998, GA07NSIAD-98- 191, Online, Available HTTP: http://www.gao.gov (2
December 1999).
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the Culver-Nunn Amendment. Unfortunately, the MOU trade is still restricted by
provisions of the U.S. National Disclosure Policy, U.S. defense mobilization base
requirements, U.S. laws and regulations (for example, DoD appropriations acts), and U.S.
industrial security requirements.
217
According to the Department of Commerce, such
laws do more than merely upset foreign defense contractors. The restrictions "stifle U.S.
competitiveness, invite foreign retaliation, and can damage U.S. industry interests over
the long term."
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While the ability of the Secretary of Defense and service secretaries to side step
The Buy American Act with Memoranda of Understanding and the efforts of acquisition
officials to eliminate DoD-enacted restrictions, the ability of the U.S. Congress to enact
new restrictions has created a protectionist system that continues to draw the ire of
foreign defense ministries. The system is further perpetuated by a domestic source
preference within the Department of Defense despite protestations to the contrary. The
DoD's statistics directorate produces a breakdown of procurement for every fiscal year.
In FY1998, the Department of Defense procured a total of $118,138,926,000 worth of
goods and services. Payment to one hundred companies and their subsidiaries accounted
for 60 percent of this total, or $70,996,368,000. 219 Of the one hundred companies
" John R. Luckey, BriefSummary Of The Buy American Act, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 101 st Cong., 1 SI
sess. Washington: GPO, 1990.
" United States, Department of Commerce, Questions and Answersfor the Legislation and National
Security Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st
sess. Washington: GPO, 1990.
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receiving the largest dollar volume of prime contract awards, only four identifiable
foreign companies received contracts. The four companies, all European, accounted for
only 2.3 percent of the top one hundred contractor's procurement total. 220
As demonstrated by the Memoranda of Understanding and NATO blanket
exemptions, the legal obstacles to transatlantic cooperation can be overcome. While the
Department of Defense will always face Congressionally-mandated restrictions, it can
help eliminate the European perception of a non-level playing field by rescinding all
administrative restrictions with exceptions given only to preserve national security. In
addition, the Department of Defense should ensure that Western European firms are
given an equal chance to compete for prime contracts. True competition will not only
allow the United States to get "value for money," to borrow a British phrase, but a
stronger cooperative relationship with Western European arms firms as well.
C. FORTRESS EUROPE VERSUS FORTRESS AMERICA
The merger of DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, Aerospatiale Matra, and
Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A., into the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space
Company has added a new dimension to the traditional support of national armaments
producers—European preference. For almost a decade, France, in particular, has urged
European governments to endorse a "European preference" when defense contract
competitions are opened. The creation of a truly pan-European defense firm has added to
the continental atmosphere. In large part, however, the Western European arms market
remains open to American products. In fact, the balance of trade is often tilted largely in
;0
The four European companies in the top 100 included #17 General Electric Company pic
($732,057,000), #31 Rolls-Royce pic ($345,054,000), #39 Philipp Holzmann Aktiengesellschaft
($304,998,000), and #49 Shell Oil Company ($254,625,000).
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favor of the United States. European government and industrial leaders often speak of a
two-way transatlantic trade route with eight lanes going from the U.S. to Europe and one
lane in the opposite direction. Even defense trade with Britain, the largest exporter of
defense goods to the United States, remains skewed in favor of U.S. manufacturers
(Table 5). 221 Whether this pattern will hold true, however, remains the question on many
American officials" minds.
Though initially supportive of industry consolidation, American industry and
government officials have become increasingly apprehensive about the direction of
Western European consolidation efforts. Bruce Jackson, a vice president of Lockheed
Martin, articulated American misgivings well: '"When Jospin celebrated the alliance [of
EADS] in Strasbourg by saying, 'This is a victory for Germany, France, and Europe,' I
have to ask, who's it a defeat for?'" Department of Defense officials have expressed
concern that the most recent consolidation efforts will produce large European
competitors with little desire to cooperate with American firms. Both former Deputy
Secretary Hamre and Under Secretary Gansler have warned of an impending "Fortress
Europe" versus "Fortress America" that will prevent transatlantic arms cooperation.
Deputy Secretary Hamre, in particular, was outspoken in his opposition to the two largest
European mergers for two main reasons—the possibility of American firms being locked
out of the European market and the loss of possible merger partners for American
companies.
221 uBalance of Trade: US/UK Defence Trade," Defence Export Services Organisation, UK Ministry of
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Table 15: US/UK Defense Trade








1986 1050.6 860.6 1.2: 1
1987 1723.8 1105.3 1.6: 1
1988 1740.2 93402 1.9: 1
1989 1848.8 918.4 2.0: 1
1990 1694.5 1031.5 1.6: 1
1991 2126.8 881.5 2.4: 1
1992 1326.0 807.7 1.6: 1
1993 1334.3 976.1 1.4: 1
1994 1234.6 608.6 2.0: 1
1995 3680.2 696.1 5.3: 1
1996 1774.4 1489.6 1.2: 1
1997 2756.8 1376.1 2.0: 1
Defence, Winning Defence Business in the United States CD-ROM, 7 April 2000.
" Gonzalez.
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Despite outward appearances of encouragement by the U.S. Department of
Defense and European governments, no potential transatlantic mergers are currently
foreseen. According to U.S. defense company officials, the key reason "is the fact that
no company can be sure how such a proposal would be met by the governments
involved—on both sides of the Atlantic." Robert Coutts, president and CEO of
Lockheed Martin's electronics sector, noted that the amount of energy, time, and money
that would be required to seek government approval by two companies is "too great to
justify, without a high degree of confidence that the transaction would win approval." 24
Statements by top DoD officials have unintentionally reinforced this negative image of
government approval. Former Deputy Secretary Hamre has continually criticized the
British Aerospace-GEC Marconi merger since its announcement in January 1999 despite
the fact that the merger could end up fostering a transatlantic link-up. Charles Grant,
Director of the Centre for European Reform noted that before the British merger, the plan
for European consolidation called for the creation of a single Western European defense
company—the European Aerospace and Defense Company (EADC). Now that there are
"at least two major players in Europe, competing transatlantic partnerships are
feasible."
225
In an interview with Bloomberg News following the Dasa-Aerospatiale Matra
announcement, Deputy Secretary Hamre expressed doubt that either the new British
company or Franco-German enterprise could acquire or be acquired by an American
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firm." In light of such large mergers in Western Europe and the perception of a
"European preference" within Western Europe, two questions beg answering:
1
.
Are Western European governments moving toward a
preference for European military hardware, and;
2. Are transatlantic mergers now necessary or desirable?
Two recent procurement decisions in the United Kingdom will undoubtedly be
used to bolster the contention that Western Europe is constructing a "Fortress Europe"
through its procurement policies. In a long awaited but largely anticipated
announcement, Geoffrey Hoon informed the British parliament on 16 May 2000 that the
Ministry of Defence had chosen the European Meteor air-to-air missile to arm Britain's
Eurofighters over its Raytheon competitor. Secretary Hoon also announced that while it
would lease four Boeing C-17 transport aircraft to meet Britain's interim airlift
requirements, the MoD would commit to order Airbus A400M transports provided other
nations make a similar commitment. 22 Under pressure by President Clinton and
Secretary Cohen on one side and the heads of state of France, Germany, and Italy on the
other, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was forced to make decisions that would upset
at least one of Britain's strategic partners. The Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(BVRAAM) competition, while billed as an American-European battle, became a trans-
national fight as Boeing joined forces with Matra BAE Dynamics in advocating the
Meteor and Raytheon brought aboard the German firm Diehl VA Systeme to help market
226 Tony Capaccio, "'Fortress Europe' Rules Out U.S. Defense Takeovers, Hamre Says," Defense Week, 25
October 1999, 15.
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its ERAAM Plus missile.22 ' While the two most recent British acquisitions went to
European manufacturers, the overall trend in British procurement is not one of European
advocacy. Since 1994, the British Ministry of Defence has purchased $8,024 billion
worth of American weapons systems, including Paveway Laser-guided bombs, C-130J
77Q
Hercules transport aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Apache attack helicopters.
In other nations, fiscal reality has forced European preference into the
background. As is natural for a sovereign state with a strong industrial base, Western
European nations tend to purchase first from national producers. The Swedes fly Saab
Gripen fighters, the French operate Giat Leclerc tanks, and the Germans sail
Brandenburg-class frigates built in German shipyards. When necessary or more
beneficial, however, Western European nations have purchased weapons systems from
the United States. Between 1994 and 1996, the French government acquired $700
million worth of defense equipment from the United States, including KC-135 tanker
aircraft and E-2 Hawkeye early warning aircraft. 230 With a smaller industrial base than
its western neighbor and a smaller procurement budget, Germany continues to seek out
the best possible product for its money. Colonel Bernd Hellstern, Deputy Commander of
the German Armed Forces Command in the United States, noted that the German
procurement officials in the Bundesamt fur Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB) must
take into consideration cost/value, quality, and need when determining from whom to
"°
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March 2000, 23.
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purchase defense products. In Germany and other Western European nations, smaller
post-Cold War budgets have dictated the necessity of open competition over any
preference for European systems.
Examining the necessity or desirability of transatlantic mergers between prime
contractors further dispels the fear of a "Fortress Europe" versus "Fortress America"
battle. Expressing his personal opinion, Mr. Steve McCarthy, the British Defence Supply
Attache in Washington, noted that the global arms market is now supporting six prime
contractors: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon in the United States and Thomson-
CSF, BAE Systems, and EADS in Europe. This transatlantic distribution allows for the
formation of balanced project teams, as witnessed by the pairing of Lockheed Martin and
BAE Systems on the Joint Strike Fighter. Keeping the six primes separate will allow for
greater "maneuvering" and create the competitive environment national governments
have struggled to maintain.232 This joint venture scenario has actually been assisted by
de facto DoD policy. Though official statements from the Department of Defense
encourage transatlantic ventures, Hamre's public comments have in effect discouraged
any attempts by either first or second tier firms. While the possibility for transatlantic
mergers exists, the probability has been greatly decreased in the near future. Pentagon
leaders such as the new Deputy Secretary, Rudy de Leon, are now avoiding criticism of
the European mergers and concentrating on making collaborative projects and lower tier
investments more attractive.
2jl
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A sign that the Fortress Europe/Fortress America mindset is waning came with
the recent announcement of two transatlantic acquisitions. On 14 April 2000, General
Dynamics released details of its purchase of Santa Barbara de Industrias, S.A. and Santa
Barbara Blindados, S.A., collectively known as ENSB. ENSB, Spain's primary producer
of combat vehicles and munitions, '"provides an opportunity for cooperation in
European, South American and North African combat vehicle and armaments
markets.'"
l
Another acquisition on the other side of the Atlantic likewise reinforces the
closer integration of American and Western European markets. John Weston, Chief
Executive of BAE Systems, announced the purchase of Lockheed Martin Control
Systems for $510 million on 27 April 2000. The purchase not only provides BAE
Systems with the Lockheed Martin division's expertise in full-authority digital engine
controls and digital fly-by-wire flight controls, but it also gives the British prime greater
presence in the American market. 234 The growing integration of the transatlantic markets
as a result of lower tier investments and joint venture projects will provide industry with
greater access to national markets while breaching the fortress mentality. The economic
benefits of open transatlantic competition should similarly dispel this protectionist
attitude.
"
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, the streets of Seattle and Washington, D.C. have served as the
battlefields of a struggle against the perceived monolithic threat of globalization by
activists of all political persuasions. At the same time, the corporate globalization
movement has assaulted one of the last bastions of sovereignty—national security. The
economic realities of declining defense budgets and a smaller global arms market have
forced governments to look beyond their own national borders when purchasing new
armaments. This new global approach by governments in both the United States and
Western Europe has resulted in an unprecedented consolidation of defense industries on
both sides of the Atlantic. While the dramatic stories of cross-border mergers, equity
transactions, and joint ventures are a reflection of the current globalization trend, the true
foundations were laid over two hundred years ago.
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations established not only the tenets of modem
capitalism but also the scope of government involvement in that system as well. In
marked contrast to the government economic policies of his day, Smith encapsulated the
essential belief in the power of markets over direct government control in a simple
phrase: the invisible hand. Smith's economic philosophy gradually took hold in Western
society as politicians, merchants, and colleagues came to understand the true power of the
marketplace. At the same time, many governments drew a line where the market-based
economy and national security concerns converged. Until economic forces spurred the
globalization movement to supersede, a neo-mercantilist system supported by direct
involvement of governments has held sway over the procurement of arms in many
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Western nations. The sudden demise of a centuries-old economic system and the
government-industrial relationship that lay at its heart requires a thorough examination of
that relationship, its evolution, the events within both the private and public sectors that
have resulted, and the transatlantic implications. This thesis has sought to address these
vital elements in order to provide an insight into the increasingly important defense-
industrial component of international security.
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONSHIP
While falling outside the pun-iew of most policy analysts and political scientists,
the issue of corporate governance displays the significant role that government plays
within the defense industry. The relationship between the owners and managers of a firm
is complicated when a national government assumes both roles along with that of
consumer. In completely or partially state-owned defense firms, the goal of profit
maximization often loses out to political goals such as the preservation of the defense-
industrial base or regional employment. In addition, such firms are often inefficient as
managers have little incentive for success. Such conclusions have guided the
privatization movement within much of Western Europe.
Driven in large part by the strong will of Margaret Thatcher, the United Kingdom
has virtually eliminated state ownership within the defense industry. The dominance of
the private sector and its reliance upon the market for direction and capital has helped
British defense firms to achieve market strength and large profits. In France, true
privatization of state-owned enterprises has been hampered by the desire of the French
government to maintain control or influence within the nation's defense industry.
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Through cross and self-shareholding schemes, the French state has created an industry
controlled by a small group of industrial investors. Large state shareholdings further
concentrate the ownership structure. It is the composition of France's ownership
structure, however, and not concentrated ownership itself that has created problems for
French firms. With the possible exception of a golden share, the French state must sell
off its holdings and encourage ownership diversification. The German corporate
governance system is likewise representative of the continental European focus on
concentrated ownership for the sake of company stability. Both the issues of government
involvement and ownership concentration will continue to play a significant role in
determining the composition of future mergers and investments. As corporate
governance systems converge with the growing importance of proxy investors, American
and Western European will be better able to match competencies and produce synergies
through mergers cross-border mergers.
B. CHANGING THE INDUSTRIAL COMPONENT
While the role of the state within the government-industrial relationship has seen
great change in recent years, such modification has been at the behest of the defense
industry. Consolidation of the industry first in the United States and later in Western
Europe has drastically altered the global arms market. A simple reduction in the number
of competitors, however, is not the solution to the shrinking procurement budgets. While
allowing the United States to proceed first with consolidation process has given the lead
to U.S. companies in terms of technology and market share, it also allowed Western
European firms to learn from the many mistakes made on the other side of the Atlantic.
With these "lessons learned" clearly in mind, Western European industrialists have
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started the consolidation process with a renewed focus on restructuring and domestic
markets. Similarly, European governments watched with keen interest the proposed
Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman merger and its subsequent DoD denial for
competition concerns. They have now focused on ensuring that the consolidation process
does not eliminate competition.
The 1999 mergers that produced systems integrator companies BAE Systems and
the European Aeronautical, Defense and Space Company (EADS) highlighted the
necessity of restructuring a merged company and not simply changing the name on the
outside of the building. The future of these new titans will depend on their ability to
streamline operations, overcome cultural obstacles, and create synergies. The land
systems sector, while not receiving the same attention as the more exciting aerospace
sector, has been the proving ground for new strategies at seizing domestic markets.
European vehicle manufacturers have and must continue to consolidate domestic markets
and enter new markets through mergers and equity transactions. Such efforts must in the
end, however, be approved by national governments. As was seen in the British approval
of Thomson's purchases within Britain, government officials now view cross-border
consolidation as a means to ensure competition. The eventual success of Western
European consolidation and the ability of European firms to compete with their U.S.
counterparts are dependent upon success in all of these areas.
C. GOVERNMENT ADAPTATION
The large number of Western European mergers in 1999 is evidence of the
industry's attempts to adapt in light of globalization and changing economic factors. The
question of government's capability to adapt to globalization and industry restructuring is
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not as concrete. The refusal of some governments to cede control of their arms
production through the ownership structure remains a hindrance to future European
industrial restructuring. The most significant obstacles, however, remain entrenched in
the culture of many European nations. The strength of labor unions and a governmental
focus on labor and employment issues continues to plague continental nations as they
seek to compete against British and American companies operating in cultures without
such obstacles. Laws such as that dictating a thirty-five hour workweek in France must
be eliminated and unions throughout Europe must be willing to accept employment and
facility cuts in order to increase productivity. Cultural changes must be advocated by the
states in Western Europe for government to match the progress made by industry.
D. TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION
As the United States contemplates its future role in Europe given the
strengthening of Europe's resolve to formulate a security policy and defense force to
carry it out, defense officials must commit to creating an atmosphere where transatlantic
cooperation can exist. The defense industries in both the United States and Western
Europe have accepted the challenge of adapting to a new, harsher environment.
Governments on both sides of the Atlantic must likewise accept the challenge of tearing
down obstacles that have hindered cooperation in the past.
Unfortunately, much of the necessary demolition must occur on our side.
Antiquated national security concerns and an effort to protect the U.S. defense-industrial
base formed the foundation of former Deputy Secretary John Harare' s feared "Fortress
America" long ago. Outdated restrictions on foreign investment in the U.S. defense
market, industrial security regulations, arms export restrictions, and legislative laws have
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colluded to prevent fair access to the U.S. market for European defense goods. Only a
concerted effort to reform the regulatory systems by all parties concerned—Department
of Defense, Department of State, and Congress—will result in more equitable trade.
In the skies over Kosovo and Yugoslavia, the United States and its NATO allies
arrived at the conclusion that the growing capability gap between the two sides must be
quickly bridged. The possibility of European forces being sidelined in a future conflict
for their inability to operate with the United States effectively is one that must be avoided
at all costs. The staging grounds for any efforts at closing the gap are within the defense-
industrial bases of the United States and Western Europe. Recognition of the changing
relationship between government and industry is necessary to not only promote the
successful restructuring of Western European industry but to create an atmosphere of
both cooperation and friendly competition in the United States and Europe.
Consolidation and restructuring within Europe is a vital process, born of economic
necessity and a growing globalization movement. As it did in the United States, this
process will reach a culminating point in the future. Whether that final point results in
transatlantic cooperation or animosity and resentment is a matter of concern for
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